China Talking Points Podcast: China’s post-bin Laden Foreign Policy by ChinaTalkingPoints

With over 60% of the world’s future nuclear power plants destined to be built in the PRC, their decisions on technology, safety, and international cooperation will have in impact well beyond the nation’s borders.

Join us as we discuss China’s response and likely next steps in the nuclear energy game.

China Talking Points Podcast: China’s Nuclear Future by ChinaTalkingPoints

This article was originally published on France24.com

The Chinese government stepped up its criticism on Thursday of US and European air strikes on Libya. ”We believe that the objective of enforcing the U.N. Security Council resolution is to protect humanitarian (objectives) and not to create an even bigger humanitarian disaster,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a regular news briefing in Beijing.

Jiang’s comments are just the latest in a series critical signals to come from Beijing over how the coalition is implementing United Nations resolution 1973 that authorised the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya and the bombing of ground targets.

Although China abstained from the vote, Beijing has been very clear in its position that the coalition air attacks risk killing civilians and should be halted immediately.

Chinese trade with Libya

Libya, like other countries in Africa, is an increasingly important Chinese trading partner. Prior to the current unrest, there was an estimated 35,000 Chinese expatriates in the country who largely worked on multi-billion dollar construction projects.

These infrastructure deals point to an increasingly close Sino-Libyan cooperation with Chinese investment in the country totalling an estimated 10 billion dollars and bilateral trade last year nearing seven billion dollars.

“The Chinese are always looking to take the pulse of African states and Middle Eastern states and if the Arab League had not come out in support of this no-fly zone or in support of sanctions I don’t  think the Chinese would have joined in, not nearly as easily as they did.” – Professor Deborah Brautigam

For some perspective on Chinese policy in Libya, I sat down with China-Africa relations scholar Deborah Brautigam of the American University in Washington, D.C. Professor Brautigam is the author of “The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa“ and blogs on the issue at “China in Africa: The Real Story.”

What was behind China’s decision to support economic sanctions against Libya and not block the passage of United Nations resolution 1973 that authorized military force against the Libyan government?

Well, the way I saw it was there was a domestic concern amongst the Chinese leadership. They were looking at companies that are doing huge number of construction projects across Libya. Those Chinese companies were being attacked and the Chinese were having to send in ships and send in planes to evacuate people. So I think if the people in China had seen their government appearing to [ignore the attacks]  on Chinese companies [it would be seen] as the Chinese government not protecting the Chinese people.

Where is the balance of interests for the Chinese in Libya between their economic investments and their political objectives internationally?

I think it’s a combination of interests but what is always foremost in Chinese concerns with the Security Council is they do not want to set a precedent to have the Security Council be turned against China when they’re dealing with their internal disputes as in Xinjiang, Tibet or Taiwan. They don’t want to set a precedent for Security Council action against them.

So that’s always a delicate dance. Now the commercial interests are there as well and we can see that in cases where there are strong commercial interests. For example, in Sudan there’s been much more of an attempt by the Chinese political machine and diplomats at the UN to water down sanctions that would hurt Chinese economic interests.

In Libya it’s a somewhat different situation. They don’t have oil interests that are very large. They don’t have a lot of oil installations, they’re doing exploration, but there isn’t much that they control there.

Most of the Chinese business activity in Libya has been in construction. I was looking back on some of the statistics on this and in 2008 they signed US$10 billion in construction contracts. So this is a lot of business but it’s not something that they need to protect through trying to hold off on sanctions.

Does China see its interests more aligned with African and Arab states than it does with the West or the UN?

That’s an interesting question. The Chinese are always looking to take the pulse of African states and Middle Eastern states and if the Arab League had not come out in support of this no-fly zone or in support of sanctions I don’t  think the Chinese would have joined in, not nearly as easily as they did.

So the Arab League was in support and the Chinese went along.  Unfortunately, African governments and the African Union have not been forceful on the Zimbabwe issue or the Sudan Darfur issue so the Chinese have been taking their cues from that as well. So they see there are a whole lot of countries in Africa, 53 countries,who  have votes at the United Nations, anyone of them could flip over and recognize Taiwan.

There’s a lot of concern in keeping those diplomatic relations happy but for the Chinese, of course, the United States and Europe are really important stakeholders in the global political economy and they care about we think but they also care a lot more then we do about what these other countries think.

Chinese society has changed so much over the past three decades that it has been difficult for peoples’ emotions, spiritual and moral beliefs to keep up. Throughout much of the economic reform period of the late 20th century, the focus was squarely on economic development. Now, as China has reached a milestone of becoming the world’s second largest economy and on its way to becoming the first, a growing number of Chinese are seeking more than just economic advancement.

Spiritual and religious activity is on the rise. This brings up a number of extremely sensitive issues as the Communist Party regards all unofficial religious activity as a direct challenge to its authority. Hundreds of under-ground churches have been closed, dissident priests, imams and all variety of spiritual leaders have been jailed in recent years.

Yet despite the government’s unwavering insistence to assert control over Chinese religious institutions, there has been a surge of interest in recent years, particularly among young people, to engage with different religions. In this week’s edition of the China Talking Points podcast, Eric suggests that the new interest in spirituality, morality and religion may be born from the excesses of materialism that have come to dominate so much of contemporary Chinese popular culture. In fact, Eric contends, that large swathes of Chinese society are encountering something of a “morality crisis.”  The basic premise, he explains, is that as the CCP replaced Confucianism (among other beliefs) with Communism in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, when communism made way for capitalism, there was no spiritual companion. Instead, people began to invest their faith in to money and achievement. The only problem, he argues, is that is ultimately unfulfilling prompting millions to now look to elsewhere for spiritual development.

Michael, in contrast, disagrees with this assessment. In his opinion, Chinese religious beliefs never really disappeared. They may have receded for a period of time but they were always there. Now, we are witnessing a resurgence of those deeply held religious values that have been central to Chinese life for centuries. Michael clearly rejects Eric’s proposition of a morality crisis in China.

Listen to the podcast and tell us what you think. Do you agree with either Michael or Eric’s perspective? Let us know.

You can also subscribe to the podcast on iTunes by clicking here.

Chinese telecommunications manufacturer Huawei is 0-2 in its bid to acquire American technology companies that begin with the letter “3.”  Their first attempt was back in 2008 when Huawei moved to acquire the struggling networking company “3com.” That $2.2 billion deal was scuttled by U.S. legislators on the grounds it presented a security threat if a Chinese company that once had (or may still have) ties to the PLA and an opaque relationship with the central government in Beijing would acquire sophisticated American networking technology. Roll the clock forward to 2011 and it’s “deja vu all over again.”  Huawei’s latest efforts to build a foundation in the US market was rejected by the US government on similar grounds. Huawei sought to buy the California-based cloud computing company 3Leaf yet once again the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) determined that it would be too risky for 3Leaf’s technology to be acquired by a Chinese company that allegedly has ties to the PLA.

So what went wrong?

In a recent interview on the new “China Policy Pod” podcast, lawyer and China Hearsay blogger Stan Abrams explains how the CFIUS review process is highly political.  That suggests then that Huawei’s is not eternally condemned to be shut out of the US market but rather that it must refine its approach. “It boils down to a question of strategy. Firms simply have to do a much better job of understanding America’s political climate, its investment-review system, and how to navigate both successfully,” explained Adam Goldberg and Joshua Galper in a recent Wall Street Journal opinion piece.

“Chinese companies must understand that legal box-ticking is only part of their challenge. Improving the political climate arguably is even more important. Western businesses long ago realized this, and expend considerable resources to educate policy makers about business concerns and to inform the public debate on business issues. It’s called lobbying and public affairs, and Chinese companies could benefit from doing these themselves.” – Adam Goldberg and Joshua Galpern

Interestingly, Huawei and other Chinese companies appear to fail at taking their own advice about how to enter new markets. It is now common knowledge that US and other foreign companies that seek to enter the China market must do massive due diligence to find the right partners, understand the evolving legal environment, establish the necessary relationships within the appropriate governing ministry and put a finger to the wind to understand the prevailing political climate. It is that public affairs piece that Huawei and other mainland Chinese companies are failing to effectively execute. Huawei transform its public image in the United States from being the type of company featured in a Richard Gere movie about “the evil Chinese corporate empire” to one that is “building communities in America and jobs for Americans.”  Huawei has steamrolled its way into developing markets in Africa, Asia and South America on the merits that its technology is more affordable and, in many cases, the only option available. That hard-nosed approach obviously does not work in the United States.

The Taiwan Example

Mainland companies, Huawei in particular, may want to look to Taiwan as an example of how to make friends in Washington.  For decades, Taipei has been among the most effective foreign governments that operate in Washington, successfully lobbying on behalf of the island’s political and corporate interests.  All that time and money has paid significant dividends over the years and now offers Huawei the ideal template on how to build an effective public policy agenda on how to succeed inside the DC-beltway.

Can the US still assert any authority?  Is China powerful enough to hold sway on any topic?  The duel topics of debt and dissent seem oddly in parallel as Eric and I discuss what external influences may play a role within China.

In this edition of the China Talking Points podcast, Michael and Eric tackle the politically sensitive issue of China’s censorship policies in both the new and traditional media sectors. Just what the Chinese government wants its people to know surfaced again last week when the government banned the word ‘Egypt’ (埃及) from micro-blogging sites and restricted all coverage of the Egyptian uprising to be managed exclusively by the Xinhua news agency.

In a dramatic flashback to an earlier period of Chinese media management, on the very night that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down from office, the People’s Daily website was among the only major international news outlets that did not mention this monumental event. Instead, the People’s Daily had a front page story celebrated increased Chinese grain production.

The Chinese government’s decision to limit access to news about the instability in North Africa is entirely predictable, however it begs the question as to whether or not the ‘cure is worse than the illness?’ That is, by denying its people access to this information how much will it cripple China’s long term ability to engage a world it increasingly dominates? Already, there are startling large information gaps among many educated Chinese about their country’s international engagement. Continued censorship of these types of events will only worsen that ignorance.

Conversely, Michael argues, the Chinese have been extremely adept at managing their information policies and if/when it is necessary to release the pressure it can do so.

We also discuss the precise measures that the Chinese employ to censor the increasingly large volume of content flowing over the air and through the ether to inform, educate and entertain hundreds of millions of Chinese. Michael explains that it is a complex blend of those famous ‘red pens’ along with the most sophisticated computer monitoring equipment on the market.