A small, yet highly energetic group of demonstrators marched through the streets of South Africa’s Umlazi Township earlier this month to protest against what they claim is Beijing’s inadequate support for the United Nations’ anti-AIDS/malaria/tuberculosis initiative known as the “Global Fund.” Organized by the internationally recognized HIV/AIDS organization AHF Ithembalabantu Clinic located along the Eastern Cape in KwaZulu-Natal, the demonstrators rallied against Beijing for not living up to its financial responsibilities in the battle against HIV/AIDS transmission in Africa.

The clinic’s central charge is that China itself has benefitted enormously from the assistance provided by the Global Fund with $941 million in grants since 2002 yet Beijing has only contributed a paltry $16 million to the fund during that same period. Moreover, they add, now that China is the world’s second largest economy and Africa’s dominant trading partner, it now has the resources to not only consume less of the Global Fund’s resources but also contribute more of its own financial assets to help the fund’s activities in Africa.

This rally went entirely unnoticed by the international media and no doubt didn’t even register among Chinese officials in Pretoria. However, everyone should take notice.  There is a growing popular perception, particularly among many in the developing world, that China is no longer a victim of the industrialized world as it now itself is among the ranks of the major powers. The AHF demonstrators clearly suggest that China is facing an entirely different set of expectations among Africans than it did in the 20th century and that Beijing now has a different level of responsibilities that  it must live up to if wants to be taken seriously as a global leader (an assumption, by the way, that still remains to be seen in Africa).

The accusations of Global Fund greed are now just the latest on a expanding list of criticisms of China’s engagement in Africa.  Allegations of widespread environmental destruction, labor rights violations and a general lack of transparency in its dealings with African governments are all contributing to a growing sense of unease among a number of prominent African observers.

China would be well-advised to take heed from the message conveyed by the women outside of the AHF clinic. If Beijing wants to continue to deepen its influence in the region, the government needs to proactively engage its critics.  Engagement does not necessarily imply that the activists’ allegations are just or even accurate, but they must be acknowledged.  If Chinese officials fall back on their natural instincts to hide behind the walls and resist dialogue with their various African constituencies, then the frustrations expressed in KwaZulu-Natal will no doubt spread.

Sunkuli claimed that Africa was better off thanks to China’s practical, bilateral approach to development assistance and was concerned that this would be changed by “Western” interference. He said he saw no concrete benefit for Africa in even minimal cooperation. Sunkuli said Africans were frustrated by Western insistence on capacity building, which translated, in his eyes, into conferences and seminars (REF C). They instead preferred China’s focus on infrastructure and tangible projects.

After all, why would any African government choose to have dozens of very well paid USAID officials write endless reports, attend numerous conferences that generate yet more reports all to little or no effect?  While this may seem like an exaggeration, the amount of bureaucracy and paperwork that has come to dominate the American aid process cannot be overstated.  Pretty much everyone inside the US aid industry itself will tell you, largely off the record, how demoralizing it is to be buried in spreadsheets and reports while producing little to no tangible benefit for those supposedly intended to benefit from American “aid.”

China’s emergence in Africa as a counterbalance to U.S. and European donors has been very positive for Africa by creating “competition” and giving African countries options. — US Embassy Beijing cable 2/11/2010

While US aid industry officials complain openly about the paperwork and bureaucracy that clearly inhibits efficiency, they will in turn defend American aid using moralistic language once only employed by evangelical Christians.  Without even a shred of humility, I have personally met dozens of US aid officials who argue passionately that China’s engagement in Africa will ultimately fail because of Beijing’s refusal to adopt “democratic principles.”  The United States in turn, according to their logic, as a “beacon of freedom” has a “moral” responsibility to employ “capacity building” techniques as a center piece of its aid program.  While this may sound pedantic, it is painfully typical of widely held sentiments throughout the American aid industry.

The level of self-righteousness on the part of US aid supporters is simply staggering.  One can only hope that this blunt assessment of the US aid process and the preference for Chinese projects that produce tangible results will serve as a long overdue wake-up call to an industry that desperately needs a new moral compass.

China utilized its fast growing control of rare earth metals as leverage in the rapidly resolved dispute, and this serve as a harbinger of future tactics or it may just serve as a lesson for how to deal with the multiple conflicts that will continue to arise as the world order adjusts to China’s prominence.

The Faceless Monolith

The prevailing perception of the Chinese in Africa is one of massive international conglomerates doing shady deals to extract the continent’s natural resources with no regard (e.g. No Strings Attached) for politics or human rights.  While there is no doubt some truth to that, as is there is with all stereotypes, it is entirely misleading.  The hundreds of thousands of Chinese who have emigrated to countries across Africa are individuals that are too often hidden behind physical and cultural walls that prohibit meaningful interactions between the Chinese and outsiders (Africans, Westerners, etc…).   This lack of engagement leads to journalists, academics and others to extrapolate based on what limited information is available and that leads us back to these huge generalizations that too often mislead the outside world.

Regrettably, the Chinese in Africa story does not fit neatly within the traditional narrative structure of western journalism.  It is just too complex a story to portray within the traditional protagonist/antagonist formula that has come to define so much of contemporary Western journalism.  To understand this story, you have to get know the individuals who live it.

Meet Kafka

Picture of Sina.com blogger "Kafka" taken in Qingdao, China

While perusing through the online classifieds posted on the Chinese in Africa BBS I came across an entry from a user named “Kafka” (卡夫卡) who emigrated a few years ago from the Eastern Chinese city of Qingdao to the Cameroonian city of Douala on the West Coast of Africa.  In his signature on that post, he included a link to his blog on the popular Chinese portal site Sina.com (the 17th largest website in the world incidentally, according the internet ranking service Alexa.com) that features entries that are essentially a diary detailing his experiences managing a small hotel and restaurant in Douala.

Kafka is typical of many young Chinese expatriates who find refuge online from the rigors of daily life in Africa.  As with all expatriates everywhere, there is obvious relief being among your own people who share a common language, values and experiences.  Chinese bloggers in general, including Kafka, are far from shy and reserved as they so often are in the presence of foreigners.  So blogs like Kafka’s are an invaluable resource to get to the personal level that is so often missing from the standard coverage of the Chinese in Africa.

“Time moves so slowly,” Kafka wrote in a June 2010 blog entry, “that it makes your brain go stupid.”  In this particular entry, that is representative of a lot of the posts from young Chinese living in Africa, Kafka shares his struggles of dealing with the monotony of daily life for young emigres in often remote parts of Africa.

“Everyday, all I know is to go online, eat, work, sleep and don’t even know what the point of reading or studying are.  Occasionally, I see online when the annual college entrance exam starts and finishes — all now faint memories of when I left school .  I once had tremendous opportunities [written with the Chinese idiom of  a 'thousand soldiers and tens of thousands of horses'] to cross those bridges (into a different defined by academic success), however today I have probably forgotten everything.

天天只知道上网、吃饭、上班、睡觉，不知道看书为何物，不知道学习为何物，偶尔在网上又看到一年一度的高考开始、结束，才隐约想起自己原来也是从学校里走出来的，原来自己也曾经从那千军万马争抢的独木桥上走过，然而如今已经忘却的差不多了。

“Before I heard people say, after work then you can become lazy, for me that’s ridiculous as I have  become so lazy [all the time], I just need to find a reason to stop [being so lazy] and when I go to work to not feel that this isn’t always the case.  Everyday I feel so lazy, lazy when I wash, lazy when I leave the house, lazy when i’m walking down the street… I just don’t know what to do with myself.

以前听人家说，上班以后人就会变得很懒，自己还在毒理偷笑，心想那只能是你自己太懒，想找个理由安慰自己罢了；而如今自己参加工作了，才知道此言非虚。每天懒得起来，懒得刷牙洗澡，懒得出门，懒得走路，真不知到自己还能做什么。

“The work life here in Africa is obviously not the same as it is back in China.  Here [in Cameroon] you don’t work from 9am to 5pm, you don’t need to check in with the boss everyday, don’t need to wear a tie; but here things just don’t work very well and there’s not the security there is back home and sometimes I am held-up at gun point and blackmailed.  There aren’t the conveniences that there in China where whatever you want you can have — if you want a certain kind of entertainment you can have it.  [Here] there’s just nothing to do but stay home, surf the web and watch TV.

非洲这里的工作生活当然和国内的不一样，这里不必朝九晚五，不必天天看着老板的脸色，不必西服领带；但是这里也有很多的不便之处，没有了国内的安全感，有时候会被抢或被人敲诈，没有国内的服务设施那般便利，想要什么就要什么，想怎样娱乐就怎样娱乐。没有事的事情，只能呆在家里上上网，看看电视。

Looking through the blogosphere

Kafka’s isolation and disappointments appear to be quite common across the Chinese in Africa blogosphere.  There are dozens of posts published in the just few weeks alone that reveal that same sense sense of personal despair.  Obviously, it is hard to tell how representative Kafka is of such a large and diverse expatriate population however, his and the other blogs do offer a rare, first-person view of the distinct challenges confronting this new immigrant population in Africa.

Africa is now the latest front in an increasingly global competition between India and China for new markets, agricultural land and access to natural resources.    While Western media and politicians have reacted with varying degrees of alarm over the surge of Chinese trade and investment in Africa, Indian companies have been quietly building their presence on the continent.

As China drives deeper into what many Indians consider their sphere of influence in South Asia, Africa offers an ideal opportunity for Indian firms to challenge China’s growing influence in the region.   For many Indians, particularly in certain political circles and on the blogosphere, competition with China is presented in a classical real politik paradigm. The headlines misleadingly frame the issue in terms of win/loss or even as a “race” between the two countries.   Although it may be compelling, even somewhat entertaining, to draw on 19th century colonial cliches (e.g. the Scramble for Africa or the Great Game) it is entirely misleading as both the Indians and Chinese are employing radically different strategies in Africa than earlier European powers.

Ironically, the enhanced competition among Chinese and Indian companies will most directly affect European and American firms who are rapidly being shut out of Africa’s emerging markets.  ”We just can’t compete when both Chinese and Indian [construction]companies are under-pricing us by 50-60 percent in Africa,” complained a senior executive of General Electric’sinfrastructure systems group who requested anonymity because of his ongoing negotiations with North African and Middle Eastern governments where he is competing directly with Chinese contractors.  ”Our cost structure and profit requirements are simply too high compared to the Chinese and Indians,” he added.  General Electric is not alone.  Throughout Africa’s major cities such as Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, low-cost Tata Motors and Great Wall cars now fill the streets where Fords, Chevrolets and VWs once did.   With increased internet connectivity, especially with the implementation of East Africa’s new fiber optic connection, it will be Wipro and Infosys Technologies that will lead the way to build outsourcing centers in Rwanda, Kenya and elsewhere.  In an earlier era that was once dominated by networking giants Cisco, Alcatel and Ericsson, Huawei is the dominant player across Africa’s growing network infrastructure industry.  In market after market, sector after sector, Western companies (except possibly in the oil sector) are being eclipsed by more nimble, lower cost Indian and Chinese rivals.

“Unlike the standard Western doom-and-gloom analysis of the African condition, China and India hold the view that Africa is a dynamic continent on the threshold of a development take-off, with unlimited business opportunities that would serve Chinese, Indian and African interests” – Fantu Cheru, Research Director of The Nordic Africa Institute

It should not be surprising that Indians and Chinese see opportunity in Africa where the West either cannot or does not compete. Many of the challenges of doing business in Africa mirror conditions in India and China where byzantine bureaucracies, widespread corruption and inconsistent infrastructure can present formidable obstacles.  Furthermore, both countries have large and growing diasporas that create vital business and distribution networks across the demographic spectrum.

Edmund Balina, founder of Washington, D.C.-based African risk consultancy Stratis Incites has written several blog posts on the subject where he details a number of factors that contribute to the growing levels of Chinese and Indian investments on the continent.  In particular, Balina contends that Chinese companies’ higher risk tolerances is a critical factor behind their willingness to invest in certain African countries and regions that others avoid:

“The FDI is mainly from parastatals that have access to low-cost capital, so that the Chinese investors have long planning horizons.  These firms view the challenging political and economic environment in such African countries as an economic opportunity.  They are able to derive huge profits from rates of return to FDI that are said to be much higher in politically volatile African countries than elsewhere.”

For more on Balina’s perspectives regarding Sino-Indian strategic competition in Africa, click on the audio link below for an extended interview with Balina for the China Talking Points “China in Africa” podcast:

China in Africa podcast: China & India Strategic Competition in Africa by ChinaTalkingPoints

It’s not just about money

While the benefits of Sino-Indian competition for the African consumer are becoming increasingly obvious as once deprived areas now have access to more products and services, regional governments are also taking advantage of the situation on a political level as well according to Fantu Cheru, Research Director of The Nordic Africa Institute:

“The Chinese and Indians are warmly welcomed to Africa for very different reasons other than economics and finance. There has been a titanic shift in attitudes towards the Western world on the part of a growing proportion of Africans. Disenchantment with the poor track record of Western development cooperation over 50 years, the double standards that Western governments practice in their relations with African states, the tendency to give aid with one hand and to retrieve it with the other through unfair trade practices and debt structures, have generated a lot of debate among Africans over the past decade, and a rallying point for pursuing an alternative and independent African development agenda.”

Constantino Xavier is among a number of academics who argue that India’s democratic political system affords it a slight advantage in its dealings with African states. “As a founding member of the Community of Democracies,  Delhi faces the opportunity to explore this “regime advantage” over China in Africa, at least in subtle and indirect ways,” according to Xavier.  Obviously, there is no empirical evidence to support this position and if the recent “election” in Rwanda is any indication, Xavier may have it entirely wrong as more and more countries draw political inspiration from Beijing over New Delhi.

From a reader and podcast listener in the United States:

“My overarching thought is that I would like to start seeing a bit more focus on the actual impacts of China in Africa (CiA), rather than Western perceptions of China in Africa. Reading your coverage of CiA, I get the impression that you are most interested in exposing western hypocrisy and misconceptions about CiA, rather than the actual effects of CiA. To me, this risks falling into what I see as a fairly well established narrative in much of academia and certain media outlets where it is considered correct to bash the former colonial powers while giving present-day African governments (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/04/AR2008010404300.html for an example), and potentially neo-colonial powers such as China, little attention.

ERIC OLANDER: You are absolutely right that among the central motivations of the China in Africa (CiA) content was to highlight the hypocrisies of the West regarding the Chinese presence in Africa.  However, I cannot agree with you more that if that is done to an extreme, it will absolutely fall in to the stereotypical trap that has ensnared so many other observers of this issue.   The hypocrisies of the West is but one part of this multifaceted story.  Subsequent to receiving your feedback, we have modified the podcast to be far more issue and country specific rather than rely on broader, over-arching issues that are much easier to generalize.

In other words, a focus on Western hypocrisy/misdeeds in Africa is nothing new, and, in my mind, is sometimes so overplayed that people/governments/institutions who should receive more scrutiny do not by virtue of the fact that they are not one of the former colonial powers.

ERIC OLANDER: On the one hand, I think you are correct in saying that blaming the old colonial powers for incompetence and greed is an old story.  However, I will take issue with you on the point of attacking the aid industry.  With few exceptions there is very little critical review of the international aid industry.  Sites like Aid Watch are among only a handful of organizations that provide any kind oversight to this multi-billion dollar industry.  The fact that the Chinese are now operating in the same environments, often to much greater effect, than the traditional aid providers is worthy of examination.

Secondly, you mentioned in your podcast with Charlie Pistorius (which was very interesting and professionally done) that you are not, or do not wish to be perceived as a China apologist, but then the substance of the podcast belied the statement. For instance, I noted that:

• You mentioned the possible negative effects of China in Africa – environmental impacts, corruption – but then didn’t really address these.
• Instead, you spent much of the podcast focusing on European and American hypocrisy regarding China. Even though you mentioned that there is hypocrisy on all sides of this issue, neither of you provided any examples of Chinese or African hypocrisy.

ERIC OLANDER: All fair points indeed.  As a reporter who has aggressively covered China for over 20 years, I do not characterize myself as an apologist.  However, in that particular interview, I do see your point that I did not properly articulate the shortcomings of Chinese or African policies.

Lastly, I found the statement you made about Westerners wanting ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ to be particularly galling. This is a gross stereotype that doesn’t add any value to the conversation. I have actually heard this sentiment expressed fairly often—by many educated Westerners and Africans (I like to avoid the increasingly hackneyed term “elites”)—and believe that it falls into the category of thinking that can be roughly described as: “it’s okay to making sweeping, generalizations about these people and what they think because their ancestors and governing structures were historical oppressors.” One, this statement can be easily falsified—I present many of my acquaintances and myself as evidence. Two, would you consider saying something like: “The Chinese like their Africans pliant, corruptible, and ruled by strong men, so they can keep siphoning off their resources and make heaps of cash from them, whilst dumping surplus people who might otherwise cause problems for the communist party”? I believe your grasp of these issues is very nuanced, so I found this statement somewhat surprising.

ERIC OLANDER: The statement that Westerners prefer ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ is rooted in the deeply held, popular perceptions of Africans as nothing more than victims in the eyes of the West.  There are very powerful, long-established “embedded narratives” that shape the news coverage and popular media surrounding Africa and Africans.   These narratives subsequently frame the image of the place and its people as nothing more than mere caricatures.  From Bob Geldof to Bono to news coverage of the current story-du-jour in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the perception of Africans generally falls in to one of four buckets: 1) Poor (Time magazine cover of Ethiopian baby); 2) Fighting (kids fighting Liberia, Somalia, et al); 3) Safari (the predominant image of the continent) and 4) singing (from Paul Simon to Shakira).   It is very difficult to challenge these simplistic notions of complex cultures and societies.  I have worked in over a dozen newsrooms around the world and the level of sophistication about Africa among journalists, editors and producers is embarrassing.  Moreover, journalists on the ground in Johannesburg, Kinshasa and elsewhere complain bitterly that they every time they pitch a story that falls outside of the embedded narrative, their editors in New York/London/Paris either show no interest or reject the idea.

Clearly, people such as you, me and others who have a more textured experience with the region and its people are more sophisticated when it comes to separating the reality from the stereotypes.  However, I contend that the culture at large (in much of the rest of the world) still regards Africa and Africans within the confines of their limited worldview — and like it that way.  Challening stereotypes is a very difficult undertaking and thus, as I said, Westerners prefer their image of Africans to be poor, needy and dependent rather than the reality that you and I both know is so very different.

From a reader and podcast listener in Scandinavia:

“I’d be wary of saying that the topic you’re talking about is commonly misunderstood or not understood.   There are many people out there doing good work on China issues and the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” might become a turn-off eventually.”

ERIC OLANDER: I agree that dismissing an idea with the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” could potentially alienate more sophisticated listeners and readers.  I will definitely pay more attention to being very specific in the future.  However, it is worth noting (as mentioned above) that in many cases, I am trying to attack particular stereotypes that are widely held in certain societies on a particular issue.  In the United States, for example, where  knowledge about China among the general public is minimal at best, there are a number of times where it is appropriate to challenge the prevailing societal view with “they just don’t get it.”  That said, it should be done sparingly and with precision.

“One of the reasons why I loved your media podcast was because it was so on point while at the same time discussing the new and important media trends in China. The podcast on the Middle East was also really interesting, but it veered a bit off point at times. There’s so much fascinating Sino-Middle East stuff to talk about without having to turn the conversation into a talk about Islamic terrorism, if you know what I mean.”

ERIC OLANDER: I am glad to hear that you found the podcast on China’s new challenges in the Middle East to be useful. Unfortunately, it appears that one of the central messages I was trying to convey was lost somewhere in the discussion.   I do believe that Islamic terrorism is a relevant topic when discussing China’s increasingly complex interests in the region.  China now has active oil interests in several countries that have well-established Islamic terror networks including Iran, Sudan and Algeria among others.  On several occasions, al Qaeda has pronounced China to be an “enemy of Islam” and threaten to attack Beijing’s interests around the world.   Al Qaeda is responding to China’s growing presence in Islamic countries as well as on behalf of Islamic separatists in Western China.  The issue of terrorism, in my opinion, is therefore germane to the broader discussion of China’s Mideast foreign policy.  I regret that this was not successfully communicated.

Due to You Tube’s length restrictions on each clip, the video has been divided into six segment.  Watch segment one above and the following can be accessed below by clicking on the images below:

Segment 2

Segment 3

Segment 4

Segment 5

Segment 6

In this edition of the China in Africa podcast, host Eric Olander talks with Washington, D.C.-based writer and journalist Te-Ping Chen.   Chen is an editor for change.org where she writes extensively on sustainability and social entrepreneurship in the developing world.    In a recent post on What the West Can Learn From China in Africa, Chen addressed the sensitive issue about China’s investment and development initiatives in Africa that diverge from traditional Western aid strategies.  Many Westerners reject the Chinese approach over concerns that Beijing’s longheld disdain for transparency breeds corruption.  However, Chen contends that the issue is far more textured than just the transparency argument presented by critics.  The Chinese, she says, employ an entirely different mindset in their approach to African economic development, one that is often misunderstood by Western journalists and observers.  The fact that Chinese investment is not tied to civil and political reform as is often required by Western aid agencies is not because they’re fundamentally corrupt, Chen argues, but rather evidence of Beijing’s agnosticism on non-economic issues.  This non-ideological, agnostic approach to development that emphasizes practical, tangible results over process ”falls outside of the traditional aid umbrella,” according to Chen, and will most likely force the West to re-evaluate its own policies that have produced mixed results at considerable expense.

Unfortunately, the phone connection with Washington, D.C. was not clear throughout the entire program, so a transcript of the podcast is available below.

CHINA TALKING POINTS: I want to start by asking you about a blog post you wrote on April 19th of last month about what the West can learn from China’s activities in Africa and in your first paragraph you talk about the suspicions that are prevalent in the West about China in general and their African policies in particular. Where do you think those suspicions come from?

CHEN: The skepticism that we see comes across in so many different ways.   It starts with language.  All this talk of China being this hungry hungry dragon on this great African adventure [is part of the] loaded language that gets used frequently in China’s involvement in Africa which feeds in to the already resident skepticism that folks already have about China.   For much of the skepticism that we see a lot of it comes down to ignorance.  There is not a lot of knowledge about China’s involvement in Africa which is a function of a number of factors:

1. A dearth of information.
2. There is a language gap, obviously
3. China has not equipped itself with a team of savvy PR experts to effectively tell its side of the story

I think a lot of this stuff comes down to the fact that there is this vacuum of information that gets filled with a lot of irresponsible media coverage.  Obviously it’s an attractive story line.  There’s this sense of almost gleeful reporting like “look who’s exploiting Africa now, you know, we’re not the only colonizers.”  That’s the kind of theme you see in quite a bit of the press, particularly in the British press.

CHINA TALKING POINTS: Is the skepticism that you describe about the Chinese in Africa separate from the larger skepticism that the media has about China as a whole or is part and parcel of the general China meme that’s out there in the media?

CHEN: I think it’s part and parcel of the general China meme with the added benefit that obviously the narrative about a new continent and Africa resonates deeply with Western audiences which is why I think you see a lot of overblown rhetoric coming out of articles that will often cite quote-unquote “critics” of China’s involvement in Africa.    Usually those will come back to the same two critics.  They’ll quote [former South African President] Thabo Mbeki and [Zambian opposition leader] Michael Sata but they won’t cite, for example, the public opinion reports which actually do find that in a number of African countries surveyed if you ask them to compare U.S. involvement in their country and Chinese involvement  that actually margins of between 60-90 percent of the people say Chinese involvement is beneficial.  And the fact that you do see that kind of one-sided presentation is quite telling.

“If you read China’s official position on development policy there’s more a sense of agnosticism and a recognition that there can be no one overarching model that can be deployed across the entire continent of Africa” – Te-Ping Chen

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  One of the other implicit themes that’s in that coverage is that the way the Chinese are going about it is somehow sinister or somehow manipulative even, dare I say it, “colonial.”  Whereas the Western aid model is considered effective and somehow seen as “without us the deluge.” When you were writing the blog post on what the west can learn from China, what were some of the ideas that you think the folks down the street from you in Washington at USAID (The United States Agency for International Development) and other agencies can learn from what the Chinese are doing in Africa?

CHEN: I think that something that is interesting to raise is the question of what we define as the Chinese model?  Typically the way we hear it being presented is in opposition to the supposed “Washington Consensus” which is much more ideologically driven, much more about democratization.  Whereas the Chinese model is presented as the Chinese willingness to do business with absolutely anybody and the political “amoralization” of their work in Africa.  I think that is obviously an aspect of China’s policy of non-interference but I think, also, there are more relevant ways you can talk about China’s work in Africa and ways that foster a way more productive discussion of aid in Africa.  For example, instead of presenting China as this exporter of dictatorship,  why not talk about the many ways that China’s aid in Africa is actually more efficient? The preference for pragmatism over paperwork? When we have a situation like what Owen Barder has written on his blog about Senegal’s 82 individual aid coordination forums that Chinese preference for pragmatism over paperwork can be quite refreshing.  And I also think as well, the Chinese model that values agnosticism that is, in many ways, better suited to the realities of development in Africa.  You know, we’re talking about a continent of over 50 countries and I think there’s a lot that Western donors and developers can learn [from the Chinese].

CHINA TALKING POINTS: OK, so, you say when you have conversations that attempt to contrast the myths with the reality that it often falls on deaf ears. What are some of the conversations that you have, even with your colleagues at change.org or in Washington about the Chinese in Africa?  Is there an appreciation for what the Chinese are doing or is it “they’re not democratic, they’re Communist nothing that they do is valid?”

CHEN: It depends, of course, on who you talk to.   I think there is an appreciation among certain circles of aid critics for the agnosticism that the Chinese model can promote over traditional western models.  I do think though in many activist circles there is a lack of knowledge and, accordingly, skepticism.  Though, then again, if you take someone like, say, Bob Geldof as any kind of bellwether, lately you’re hearing more accommodating statements like “the U.S. is pulling out and China at least is still committed to Africa.” And, as well, Duncan Green of Oxfam has pointed out the greater involvement of China in Africa  does give African nations more of a bargaining opportunity in its relationship with the West.

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  Yeah, it strikes me as rather surprising given the scale of China’s participation and engagement with Africa — now the second largest trading partner with Africa, soon to be the first — their investments are more diversified than the Americans which are largely in the oil sector – that there isn’t broader awareness of what’s happening and geopolitically how critically important it is as the United States needs to diversify its oil supplies away from the Middle East to more stable places.  Why do you think there is such a blind spot when it comes to this very important trend that is taking place?

CHEN: Again, a lot of it is the fact that there isn’t a lot of information out there and what is being supplied is being supplied through pieces of the narrative that don’t present the full picture.  I think the media has sort of seized upon this narrative of ”China in Africa” and “China’s African Safari” and it’s very much focused on one level.    You’ll hear about how Chinese goods areshoddy but you don’t hear about the benefits for consumers.  You’ll hear again about all these critics but you won’t hear about all the public opinion polls saying that Africans appreciate China’s presence.  So I do think that you see that vacuum of information being filled by the same tired kinds of articles and my hope is that we are going to be able to get beyond Howard French’s piece of “meet Africa’s latest colonizer.”

CHINA TALKING POINTS: Yeah, using the terminology “colonizer” and “colony” sets the wrong tone because it’s really not that, and that’s what is so dangerous is that people are thinking it’s like a British or European colonial adventure when in fact it’s something very different.   I want to go back to a point that you brought up earlier about this idea of competing ideologies.  I have a theory and I’d like to hear your reaction to it:  that there is a war of ideas and many Americans think that now the cold war is over and the Soviets had one way of looking at the world and the Americans had another.  We won game finished.  Now I wonder if there is this new ideological war that is going on that is divided into three categories — the so-called “Washington Consensus” led by the United States and Western Europe that emphasizes civil and political rights alongside economic development.  The second one is religious extremism as best exemplified by Al Qaeda in places like North Africa, the Caucuses and the Middle East.  Finally, there is the “Beijing Consensus” that is very appealing as it offers countries the chance to modernize without Westernizing.  What’s your reaction to this kind of theory and if it’s plausible that it’s being played out in places like Africa?

CHEN: That’s a tough one.  I think you’re certainly picking up on one element of what’s happening and there’s no doubt that Beijing does present a different model, if you want to call it that, to the “Washington Consensus.”   But I also think that a number of Chinese officials would be a little bit hesitant to embrace that their “model” is in fact a quote-unquote “model.”  If you read China’s official position on development policy there’s more a sense of agnosticism and a recognition that there can be no one overarching model that can be deployed across the entire continent of Africa, much less in Asia.   So if there is any alternative being promoted, I’d like to think that there is this sense that just as China found its own path out of poverty without the influence of multilaterals and aid agencies, likewise I think it can serve not exactly as a compass, but certainly a demonstration of the fact that it’s possible to build your own independent path towards development however that’s defined in your country.

“You’ll hear again about all these critics but you won’t hear about all the public opinion polls saying that Africans appreciate China’s presence” - Te-Ping Chen

CHINA TALKING POINTS: You mentioned earlier about some of the shortcomings the Chinese have in termsof their ability to communicate their story and the ability to articulate what they are doing and thus allows a vacuum for critics to fill with sometimes nonsense and misinformation.   With that in mind, what are some of the risks the Chinese face as their engagement with Africa increases?  What are some of the “potholes” they need to be aware of?

CHEN: It depends on where you are looking, but certainly in Africa some of the bigger points of conflict have been over labor relations and we have seen from some of the bigger Chinese firms that the longer they stay in Africa the more locals they need to hire.  Again, this notion that China through its special economic zones [in Africa] will be able to create “Chinese enclaves” has been damaging and will continue to be damaging.  I think to an extent that’s offset by something that you’ve documented in your own work Eric, unlike Western workers in Africa, the million plus Chinese immigrants that have come to Africa tend to live side by side with Africans, tend to speak local dialects, purchase food at the local markets and aren’t driving around in massive SUVs. The question of transparency too has continued to dog China, particularly in Africa.  I think for Western observers we have to be a little bit careful there when we talk about it though.  To me, what matters is results on the ground and to an extent we have seen this issue of transparency has just served as a conversation stopper. Beyond that I think it’s important for China to be able to communicate that it really is around for the long haul and that’s another big misconception about China’s development in Africa that it’s the “Great Chinese Takeout” and that the Chinese are there to grab their oil, grab some trees and get out — and that’s not the case, it’s a more textured exchange one in which many more Chinese are immigrating [to Africa].  China’s shift to Africa is part of the country’s shift away from its focus on production of cheap consumer goods like t-shirts and the like towards more emphasis on higher value goods.

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  So, finally, what do you think is the most important aspect of what the Chinese are doing in Africa that people should understand?

CHEN: A lot of coverage in the West misses the fact that the China’s engagement in Africa has extended over decades, likewise they are mis-portraying this notion of the great Chinese take out when, in fact, you look at immigration, when you look at China’s positioning in Africa is really part of the country’s broader  hope to transition away from its emphasis on just the production of cheap consumer goods, t-shirts and the like, they’re really hoping to use Africa as an opportunity to move up the value chain and develop factories in Africa as part of that process.  So I think that one of the chief misconceptions is this great resource grab, this “Great Chinese Takeout” when in fact the Chinese are not intending to leave.

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About Te-Ping Chen

Te-Ping Chen is an editor at Change.org.  Most recently she was a staff reporter for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.  In recent years, her writing has appeared in outlets that include the Nation Magazine, the American Prospect, the South China Morning Post magazine, Le Soir and Slate.com.  She is a U.S. Truman Scholar whose work has shared awards from the Overseas Press Club and Investigative Reporters and Editors.