Travel to almost any African capital and even before you make it from the airport to downtown there is a very high likelihood you will pass a Chinese construction project along the way.  From the new terminal at Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi to the main road connecting Kinshasa’s N’Djili Airport to the city center, the Chinese construction boom is immediately evident.

Simply put, the magnitude of China’s construction drive in Africa is so vast that only the rapid industrialization of the Chinese economy itself and the U.S.-funded Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after World War II can compare in scale.

All this construction is a central component of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda where it builds roads, dams, hospitals and other badly needed infrastructure in developing countries in exchange for vital natural resources.  On the surface, this arrangement has all the hallmarks of pure mercantilism but to leave it at that overlooks critical subtleties that are now beginning to sway the balance of international influence across the continent.

In a recent article for the Asian affairs website “The Diplomat,” military affairs journalist David Axe details how Chinese construction projects are opening a new front in Beijing’s increasingly ambitious global soft power agenda.    China, he writes, is simultaneously competing for influence with the established foreign powers in Africa while copying Western diplomatic tactics.

“Where the U.S. sends soldiers, the Chinese build roads.  Their approach [to soft power diplomacy] could not be farther apart.” – Military Affairs Journalist, David Axe

Earlier this year, Axe spent two months in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where he covered a U.S. military joint training operation with the Congolese armed forces.  To get from his hotel to the training grounds, Axe and the U.S. troops drove along Boulevard 30 Juin, Kinshasa’s main thoroughfare that was recently re-paved and widened by the Chinese.  That road, Axe realized, had come to represent the stark differences in how Beijing is engaging with countries like the DRC and Washington’s growing reliance on its military:

“That China and the United States are in a race to gain sway over countries possessing vital natural resources, not only in Africa but across the developing world, is hardly news. But the scene in Kinshasa—US troops speeding down a Chinese-built road—underscores the differing strategies Washington and Beijing have tended to pursue. While it has fallen on the US military to lead the country’s forays into Congo and other mineral-rich nations, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan, China has traditionally preferred underwriting infrastructure projects.”

In addition to the public perception benefits associated with building infrastructure in many of the world’s poorest countries, Beijing is also turning to its military forces as another tool in its soft power diplomacy kit, according to Axe.  The deployment of Chinese naval forces off the coast of East Africa to take part in multi-national anti-piracy operations along with the launch of the new hospital ship “866″ are two recent examples that Axe highlights to demonstrate how the Peoples Liberation Army (and navy — the PLAN) are playing an important role to shape African perceptions of the Chinese.

While media outlets like Xinhua and CCTV along with educational organizations such as the Confucius Institutes have traditionally been the centerpiece of China’s public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, it appears that Beijing may have a much broader soft power agenda that also includes all of those roads and bridges as well.

The interview with David Axe and other ‘China in Africa’ podcasts are all available on iTunes.  Click here for more information.

By any measure, the DRC is one of the most difficult places on earth to do business.

Let’s put aside for now the problems associated with the war in the east as that’s not really the issue here.

instead, we’re going to focus on  what it actually takes to get business done in a place where there’s only a hint of a functioning government.  And what little government there is is corrupt beyond your wildest imagination.

Take the figures from Transparency International’s 2009 Corruptions Perception Index that puts the DRC close to the bottom of the list, just shy of Afghanistan and Somalia.

So in a place where there’s essentially no rule of law and ubiquitous corruption, how do the Chinese the manage their multi-billion dollar investments in the country?

For some insights, I turned to Swedish researcher Johanna Jasson who co-authored a report for the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  She’s now pursuing her Phd in Denmark.

Jassen spent a considerable amount of time last year researching Chinese corporate activity in both Katanga and Lubumbashi, especially that huge 6 billion dollar Sicomines deal.

Gabon is that tiny country along the central west Africa that is often overlooked by its larger, more controversial and considerably more powerful neighbors.  With only 1.5 million people, Gabon is one of Africa’s smallest countries. Along with its modest population, Gabon also maintains a low-profile. Rarely does it make headliness in ways that neighboring Equatorial Guinea does where the ruling family/government there stands accused of widespreadl human rights abuses, corruption on a grand scale and even narcotics trafficking among other indiscretions.  Instead, Gabon is a stable, relatively democratic country that is aggressively pursuing foreign investors to drill, mine and harvest its vast reserves of natural resources.

It’s not surprising the Chinese have recognized Gabon’s potential, particularly in the mining and forestry sectors.  85% of the country is blanketed in thick, equatorial rain forests that has attracted China’s large timber and logging companies.  However, Chinese companies, particularly logging firms, face distinctive challenges in Gabon compared to their experiences elsewhere in the region.  Unlike in the Republic of Congo, where Chinese logging concessions have aggressively clear cut their way through the country’s supposedly protected national forests, the Gabonese government says it is committed to preserving its national parks.  Libreville has designated 11% of its territory, one of the largest such commitments in the world, to be included in its national park system and off limits for development and logging.

“The narrative of the Chinese taking over [in Gabon] is not entirely accurate, what is accurate is that the Chinese presence has grown a lot but it’s [still not very] big.” – Johanna Jansson, researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs

The Chinese, though, face a much more daunting challenge in Gabon from France.  The French once colonized Gabon and have retained considerable political, economic and cultural influence since independence in 1960.   Gabon’s national language is French, the country’s legal and regulatory systems are inspired by the French and the Chinese must compete against French companies have deep historical ties with Gabon’s elite that go back decades, even generations.  In Gabon, as in China, 关系 or guanxi is critical to success and as the newcomers, China’s big state owned companies don’t have very much of it and must work hard to catch up.   Currently, the French remain the dominant foreign investors in Gabon and observers do not expect the arrival of the Chinese to have much of an impact on the status quo anytime soon.

Gabon presents an interesting case study for China’s engagement in Africa.  Here, it will have to work harder against established international companies, particularly major French conglomerates.  Also, with a more stable, less corrupt central government in Libreville, Chinese actors will not have the maneuverability they do in places the Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Madagascar where the legal system is, well, more “flexible.”   Here, the Chinese will have to adapt and learn the hybrid Franco-Gabonese political system and cultural norms.

There does not appear a lot of research or news coverage on the Chinese activities in Gabon, but what is available is quite good.  Swedish academic Johanna Jansson has done some excellent field research as part of a collaboration among the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa.   Their report provides a great high level overview of Chinese companies operating in the extractive industries in both Gabon and the DRC.  Download a PDF of the report here. It’s worthwhile reading.  Jansson also wrote an article for South Africa-based Pambazuka News on Chinese Investments in Gabon’s Extractive Industries that provides additional coverage of the issue.

From a reader and podcast listener in the United States:

“My overarching thought is that I would like to start seeing a bit more focus on the actual impacts of China in Africa (CiA), rather than Western perceptions of China in Africa. Reading your coverage of CiA, I get the impression that you are most interested in exposing western hypocrisy and misconceptions about CiA, rather than the actual effects of CiA. To me, this risks falling into what I see as a fairly well established narrative in much of academia and certain media outlets where it is considered correct to bash the former colonial powers while giving present-day African governments (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/04/AR2008010404300.html for an example), and potentially neo-colonial powers such as China, little attention.

ERIC OLANDER: You are absolutely right that among the central motivations of the China in Africa (CiA) content was to highlight the hypocrisies of the West regarding the Chinese presence in Africa.  However, I cannot agree with you more that if that is done to an extreme, it will absolutely fall in to the stereotypical trap that has ensnared so many other observers of this issue.   The hypocrisies of the West is but one part of this multifaceted story.  Subsequent to receiving your feedback, we have modified the podcast to be far more issue and country specific rather than rely on broader, over-arching issues that are much easier to generalize.

In other words, a focus on Western hypocrisy/misdeeds in Africa is nothing new, and, in my mind, is sometimes so overplayed that people/governments/institutions who should receive more scrutiny do not by virtue of the fact that they are not one of the former colonial powers.

ERIC OLANDER: On the one hand, I think you are correct in saying that blaming the old colonial powers for incompetence and greed is an old story.  However, I will take issue with you on the point of attacking the aid industry.  With few exceptions there is very little critical review of the international aid industry.  Sites like Aid Watch are among only a handful of organizations that provide any kind oversight to this multi-billion dollar industry.  The fact that the Chinese are now operating in the same environments, often to much greater effect, than the traditional aid providers is worthy of examination.

Secondly, you mentioned in your podcast with Charlie Pistorius (which was very interesting and professionally done) that you are not, or do not wish to be perceived as a China apologist, but then the substance of the podcast belied the statement. For instance, I noted that:

• You mentioned the possible negative effects of China in Africa – environmental impacts, corruption – but then didn’t really address these.
• Instead, you spent much of the podcast focusing on European and American hypocrisy regarding China. Even though you mentioned that there is hypocrisy on all sides of this issue, neither of you provided any examples of Chinese or African hypocrisy.

ERIC OLANDER: All fair points indeed.  As a reporter who has aggressively covered China for over 20 years, I do not characterize myself as an apologist.  However, in that particular interview, I do see your point that I did not properly articulate the shortcomings of Chinese or African policies.

Lastly, I found the statement you made about Westerners wanting ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ to be particularly galling. This is a gross stereotype that doesn’t add any value to the conversation. I have actually heard this sentiment expressed fairly often—by many educated Westerners and Africans (I like to avoid the increasingly hackneyed term “elites”)—and believe that it falls into the category of thinking that can be roughly described as: “it’s okay to making sweeping, generalizations about these people and what they think because their ancestors and governing structures were historical oppressors.” One, this statement can be easily falsified—I present many of my acquaintances and myself as evidence. Two, would you consider saying something like: “The Chinese like their Africans pliant, corruptible, and ruled by strong men, so they can keep siphoning off their resources and make heaps of cash from them, whilst dumping surplus people who might otherwise cause problems for the communist party”? I believe your grasp of these issues is very nuanced, so I found this statement somewhat surprising.

ERIC OLANDER: The statement that Westerners prefer ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ is rooted in the deeply held, popular perceptions of Africans as nothing more than victims in the eyes of the West.  There are very powerful, long-established “embedded narratives” that shape the news coverage and popular media surrounding Africa and Africans.   These narratives subsequently frame the image of the place and its people as nothing more than mere caricatures.  From Bob Geldof to Bono to news coverage of the current story-du-jour in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the perception of Africans generally falls in to one of four buckets: 1) Poor (Time magazine cover of Ethiopian baby); 2) Fighting (kids fighting Liberia, Somalia, et al); 3) Safari (the predominant image of the continent) and 4) singing (from Paul Simon to Shakira).   It is very difficult to challenge these simplistic notions of complex cultures and societies.  I have worked in over a dozen newsrooms around the world and the level of sophistication about Africa among journalists, editors and producers is embarrassing.  Moreover, journalists on the ground in Johannesburg, Kinshasa and elsewhere complain bitterly that they every time they pitch a story that falls outside of the embedded narrative, their editors in New York/London/Paris either show no interest or reject the idea.

Clearly, people such as you, me and others who have a more textured experience with the region and its people are more sophisticated when it comes to separating the reality from the stereotypes.  However, I contend that the culture at large (in much of the rest of the world) still regards Africa and Africans within the confines of their limited worldview — and like it that way.  Challening stereotypes is a very difficult undertaking and thus, as I said, Westerners prefer their image of Africans to be poor, needy and dependent rather than the reality that you and I both know is so very different.

From a reader and podcast listener in Scandinavia:

“I’d be wary of saying that the topic you’re talking about is commonly misunderstood or not understood.   There are many people out there doing good work on China issues and the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” might become a turn-off eventually.”

ERIC OLANDER: I agree that dismissing an idea with the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” could potentially alienate more sophisticated listeners and readers.  I will definitely pay more attention to being very specific in the future.  However, it is worth noting (as mentioned above) that in many cases, I am trying to attack particular stereotypes that are widely held in certain societies on a particular issue.  In the United States, for example, where  knowledge about China among the general public is minimal at best, there are a number of times where it is appropriate to challenge the prevailing societal view with “they just don’t get it.”  That said, it should be done sparingly and with precision.

“One of the reasons why I loved your media podcast was because it was so on point while at the same time discussing the new and important media trends in China. The podcast on the Middle East was also really interesting, but it veered a bit off point at times. There’s so much fascinating Sino-Middle East stuff to talk about without having to turn the conversation into a talk about Islamic terrorism, if you know what I mean.”

ERIC OLANDER: I am glad to hear that you found the podcast on China’s new challenges in the Middle East to be useful. Unfortunately, it appears that one of the central messages I was trying to convey was lost somewhere in the discussion.   I do believe that Islamic terrorism is a relevant topic when discussing China’s increasingly complex interests in the region.  China now has active oil interests in several countries that have well-established Islamic terror networks including Iran, Sudan and Algeria among others.  On several occasions, al Qaeda has pronounced China to be an “enemy of Islam” and threaten to attack Beijing’s interests around the world.   Al Qaeda is responding to China’s growing presence in Islamic countries as well as on behalf of Islamic separatists in Western China.  The issue of terrorism, in my opinion, is therefore germane to the broader discussion of China’s Mideast foreign policy.  I regret that this was not successfully communicated.

Before the Francis’ brother impressive documentary “When China Met Africa” was broadcast on BBC4, rival UK network Channel 4 ITV produced “China’s African Takeover” in 2008.  Reporter Aidan Hartley and producer travel through Zambia and the DR Congo to document conditions in Chinese-run mine and agricultural operations.  In general, they paint a very grim picture of the conditions that local workers endure under Chinese management and it provides a sobering overview of the harsh realities on the ground that confront both Chinese and Africans alike.

While this production is two years old, it nonetheless remains worthwhile viewing.

Segment 2

Segment 3

In this edition of the “China in Africa” podcast, Johannesburg-based blogger and academic Charlie Pistorius says the debate over whether  Chinese investment in Africa is either good or bad is entirely irrelevant.  Instead, one should evaluate the substantive outcome of China’s policies which will invariably produce a far more nuanced perspective.   In a pair of noteworthy essays published on his blog www.toseque.com, Pistorius walks us through the difficulties that come with framing the China in Africa debate in terms of “good” and “bad.” In part one of his series “Are We Seeing a Sino-African Revolution,” Pistorius explores the issue of whether China’s “brigade model” of development may be a better fit for African populations that are more communally oriented than in the West.  This is a critical issue in the context of comparative development models for many African societies.  Specifically, through their own agricultural, industrial and economic development experience over the past thirty years of the Chinese reform period, Beijing’s expertise in these areas may  be significantly more relevant for Africa than those “solutions” proposed by the likes of the IMF, World Bank and USAID among others.

In part two of the series, Pistorius highlights the double standard that confronts China and its policies in Africa.  Specifically, the perception that the Chinese are somehow more aggressive than Western countries with their resource extraction agenda.  One area in particular Pistorius examines is oil: “It is true that China has up to date mostly imported minerals and oil from Africa – oil making up 62% of its total imports from Africa in 2008. Although to put that in context, US oil imports from Africa came to 88% in the same year, with minerals making up most of the difference. The bigger picture here shows that while China only took between 9-13%[2.2] of Africa’s oil exports – to my bewilderment – the US and Europe each received 33% respectively.”

“It’s not whether China’s role in Africa is good, it’s what Africans can do to enhance their own position in this bargaining game. [Are the Chinese] Colonialists? No.  They are mercantilists.  I think Africans are getting a lot more power in negotiating [with the Chinese] and overall there seems to be a benefit.” – Charlie Pistorius, www.toseque.com

In the second half the podcast, we focus specifically on South Africa and how the country’s distinctive history offers both unique challenges and opportunities for the growing number of Chinese immigrants there.  Many of the Chinese immigration trends that are developing in the rest of Africa appear to be distinct from what is happening in South Africa, argues Pistorius.   In contrast to countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where large populations of low-income Chinese migrants are settling, South Africa’s Chinese community is significantly more gentrified.  As such, assimilation to the larger society, according to Pistorius, occurs in proportion to economic necessity.  Therefore, the country’s well-established Chinese entrepreneurial class is reportedly less integrated to the broader society than lower-income migrants who must learn to speak local dialects and interact with the community out of pure economic imperative.  If this is in fact true, then South Africa may be a precursor to the evolution of Chinese communities in other African countries as the Chinese immigrant populations there gentrify in the coming years.

In the end, French reaches the same, stereotypical conclusion that most Western writers come to with their China in Africastories, that Beijing is merely following the same path of colonial exploitation as Europeans and Americans did duringtheir imperial adventures.  In fact, French’s last paragraph of the article concludes that the relationship between Africa and China will mirror Africa’s previous ties to other empires through the extraction of raw materials and the re-importation to Africa of finished products.  This is where French is either mis-informed or doesn’t fully understand the scope of China’s engagement in the region.

So while you read the article yourself, I propose the following additional points to consider:

• The Chinese engagement with Africa cannot simply be defined on an economic level, the arrival of hundreds of thousands (soon to be millions) of poor Chinese immigrants who are moving in to neighborhoods across the continent will have a profound impact.  In less than five years, there are now more Chinese immigrants in Africa than France had at the height of its colonial power on the continent.  These immigrants are not just the workers who labor on the infrastructure and mining projects, but also economic migrants who are establishing small businesses and contributing to an emerging civil society in ways that billions of dollars of wasted Western economic development assistance could never achieve.

• At one point in the article, French mentions “when the Chinese leave” which is another key difference between the Chinese presence in Africa and former Western colonial powers.  Simply put, the Chinese are NOT leaving.  This is not like the French, Germans or British who left when it was no longer economically viable to sustain their expensive colonies.  Just as there are now a million ethnic Chinese living in Southern California who have no intention of returning to Asia, the Chinese emigres are building a permanent presence in Africa.

• French, like the overwhelming majority of his journalistic colleagues, concludes skeptically that China will ultimately fail to build any sustainable economic engagement with Africa.  In the end, they contend, it comes down to merely pulling out as much oil, gold, bauxite and other natural resources from the earth.  The reason I challenge French on this point is that he goes to the same guy that every other journalist contacts to get “the other side of the story.”  Zambian opposition leader Michael Sata is the most outspoken critic of the Chinese in Africa, particularly in his own country.  The fact that almost every article on the subject features a quote from Sata is either evidence of journalistic laziness (a real possibility) or the fact that it may be difficult to find articulate critics of the Chinese.  It’s disappointing that French and other writers do not venture off the main roads, past the big construction sites and away from the academic and political elites to get the layman’s perspective on the Chinese in their countries.  When I did this during my time in Kinshasa, I found far more nuanced and textured answers than what was provided to me by so-called “experts.”  French fails to deliver that important perspective strongly enough.

• French offers a cynical view on the value of low-cost Chinese imports to Africa.  Just as Wal-Mart did in the United States where it recognized there was a viable market among the working poor that most other companies ignored, China is opening new markets for its products at the lowest rung of the economic ladder in developing countries across South Asia, South America and Africa.  Liberal elites in the coastal U.S. cities turn their noses up at Wal Mart with the same dismissive attitude they display for China’s arrival in the Southern Hemisphere.  The fact remains in places like the DRC where people have extremely limited disposal income, the ability to purchase headphones, toys, food products and electronics is nothing short of revolutionary.  These are all products we take for granted in developed societies and things that critics hope developing societies will avoid so as to prevent the corruption their “traditional” cultures.  The overwhelming cultural arrogance of that perspective is a separate issue, while the Chinese offering this critical service deserve praise.  The Chinese are operating in markets with such limited margins where Western and Japanese companies simply cannot compete with their significantly higher cost structures.  Contrary to popular journalistic perception, the Chinese behavior in these markets is nothing like their colonial predecessors and deserve separate analysis.

China is not just bringing piles of cash and construction trucks to Africa, hundreds of thousands of immigrants are also making the long journey to resettle in cities like right here in Kinshasa.  These immigrants, like Mister Chen who we profiled earlier, are coming here in search of opportunity and to build a better life for their families.  They are opening businesses large and small in out of the way neighborhoods that largely go unseen by the casual observer.  In so many ways, the Chinese entrepreneurial enthusiasm is a welcome addition to poor and dysfunctional communities that essentially operate outside of the formal economy.  In short, the Chinese are bringing desperately needed jobs, goods and services.  Human culture being what it is though, there is also tremendous risk with how the Chinese ultimately assimilate with Congolese and other African cultures.  Initially, the arrival of those Chinese business were greeted either with indifference or welcomed as a positive addition to the community.  Now, however, the first rumblings of unease are beginning to emerge as some communities find the Chinese presence to be more problematic than they had initially thought.  This issue was most recently brought to light in Namibia where the growing competition from Chinese hair salon owners prompted the government to place an outright ban on Chinese ownership of these types of beauty parlors.  Separately, I am hearing more and more firsthand reports from Congolese who have friends and relatives working on Chinese construction projects who complain that Chinese foremen are becoming increasingly aggressive with their local employees.  It has been well documented that in countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Algeria (source: China Safari, 2009) that many Chinese employers lack cultural sensitivity skills that would endear them to local populations.

To many Chinese, these so-called “soft skills” are meaningless.  The common retort from many Chinese business owners and project managers is that local workers complain because the Chinese work harder and demand more from their employees than do African companies.  The fact that local workers are complaining about working for low wages or not being paid at all just further reinforces that Chinese mindset.   In fact, the emotional standoff between Chinese merchants and their African critics is very similar to the same arguments made about cultural insensitivity by the Chinese in certain minority -populated provinces in China.  Now, let me be very clear here.  I do not have an opinion as to whether or not the popular sentiment held by the majority Han culture in China is correct or the views of minorities who feel their cultures are being paved over.  I will leave those questions to far more learned observers.  My point is that the debate is so similar.  The Han perspective emphasizes economic development as evidence by infrastructure construction.  Sentimentality for culture or religion is rarely a priority when measured against infrastructure development in economically deprived regions.

Considering the tremendous speed the Chinese are moving in Africa, particularly here in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there may good reason to allocate a small percentage of that investment to building cultural ties between the Chinese and their African hosts.  The Congolese, for example, seem overwhelmingly positive about the Chinese arrival.  They regard the Chinese initiatives with optimism and see their enthusiasm for Africa as welcome relief from the failed policies of the West.  That said, the DRC is an extremely volatile country where a spark can light a blaze in seconds.  If the Chinese are not carefully with their cultural investment, it could handicap their broader regional agenda.

Does China Help or Hurt? Over at “The China Beat” blog writer, Angilee Shah posts another in a wave of reviews of Deborah Brautigam’s new book on the Chinese in Africa,  ”The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa.” Shah raises a few good points in her post about the important fact that is overlooked by most Western diplomats here in the Congo and elsewhere that China itself is a developing country with specialized expertise in working in under-developed conditions similar to what is available across Africa.  That specialization in low-cost, effective development offers tremendous potential especially when compared to American and European aid efforts that are seemingly obsessed with process and paperwork over results.

Do the Chinese hire locals? Speaking of Professor Brautigam, her excellent blog “China in Africa: The Real Story” links to a You Tube video from one DR Congo’s TV stations that confirms my own observations here in Kinshasa that the Chinese use a blend of Chinese and local labor for their massive construction projects.  From what I have seen here, each construction crew has dozens of Kinois who work under the supervision of a handful of Chinese foremen.  This is among the most sensitive issues both here in the DRC and elsewhere in the region where political leaders are expressing their frustration with the Chinese over the use of too many imported Chinese laborers at the expense of local hires.  Furthermore, several sources have told me that in other Congolese provinces, Chinese employers are regarded to be “overbearing” and are often embroiled in disputes over pay with local employees.  This is definitely an issue to watch as Chinese investment here continues to grow.

Scan the headlines about the Chinese in Africa and the predominant theme focuses almost exclusively on the infrastructure-for-natural resource deals.  The Chinese are signing multi-billion dollar oil and mineral deals up and down the continent while spending a comparable fortune building desperately needed infrastructure in many of the least developed countries on earth.  Here in Kinshasa, evidence of China’s foreign and trade policies is everywhere.  New roads, hospitals, parliament buildings are all being built at record speeds by Chinese construction conglomerates.  Yet not far away from the heavy earth moving trucks and the billion dollar mineral deals, a separate, yet equally transformative revolution is underway.  Quietly, tens of thousands, possibly even  hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants are moving in to neighborhoods across Kinshasa and dozens of African cities.  While there is no reliable data available to estimate just how many emigres have come here, there is no doubt the Chinese population is rising quickly.

When I first heard that Kinshasa was now home to thousands of Chinese immigrants, I naturally assumed there would some sort of “Chinatown” with a population cluster just as there is in Paris, Los Angeles, Buenos Aires and even Asian cities like Kuala Lumpur.  It just made sense that the first wave of Chinese arrivals would huddle together as immigrants have done the world over for generations.  ”So where is the Chinese community?” I asked a several of our local staff.  Puzzled, they responded “what do you mean? There is no Chinese community here, they live with us.”  Time and again I received the same answer.  The Chinese immigrants in Kinshasa are skipping an entire phase of assimilation by moving directly to the sprawling neighborhoods and shantytowns that is home to the capital’s 8-10 million residents.  By any standard, this is a remarkable phenomenon as there are few more seemingly divergent cultures than Chinese and Congolese.  Yet despite overwhelming differences in language, race and culture, the Chinese are adapting in ways that Westerners could never begin to imagine.

Mister Chen is one of those thousands of new arrivals to Kinshasa.  He and his family moved from China’s southern Fuzhou province three years ago to come to Africa.  When he first learned of the opportunity to come to the DRC he admitted that he knew nothing about the country as was made clear by their decision to settle in the eastern Congolese city of Kivu.  Traveling over land from the Rwandan capital of Kigali, they arrived in Kivu unaware that it is the epicenter of Congo’s violent 10-year war.  Hundreds of thousands of people, possibly millions, have died in the region surrounding Kivu and after three weeks he packed up his family to move west across the country to the relative safety of Kinshasa.  Upon arrival here he was introduced to a “Chinese association” that would provide him the logistical and financial support for him to open a small shop in one of Kinshasa’s vast, densely populated neighborhoods.  These associations are critical to understanding the success of the Chinese, both here in Kinshasa and the world over.  Just as Chinese immigrant associations in San Francisco and New York, the Chinese associations in the DRC provide what is essentially a micro-loan to new immigrants and the necessary logistical support to open a small business.  The association handles the legal paperwork, ensures the necessary bribes are paid to relevant neighborhood police and government authorities; connects the shop owner with a distribution network of Chinese importers to supply their business.  Mister Chen said he arrived from China with “only a few dollars” but was able to get his start through the help of the association.  In turn, as his business develops, he re-pays the association back in small increments until the loan is fully paid.  The association also plays another critical role that insulates the shop owner from the volatility of daily life in Kinshasa.  When the police or some other government authority comes to his store for bribes or extortion, he simply calls the association who then quickly respond to handle the situation.  This rapid response and protection from the association is an immensely important aspect of the Chinese entrepreneurial success here as it offers a level of reliability largely unavailable in a society as unstable as Kinshasa.

Mister Chen’s store has the feel of an inner-city American liquor store where all of the products are on display behind a think glass window.  He largely sells cheap, low quality Chinese-made knick-knacks that range from one-dollar headphones to shoes to plastic tableware.  Although business in his 1,500 square foot (estimate) shop was brisk during my 45-minute mid-day visit, not once did I see him sell a single product.  Instead, locals would approach the counter, throw down a $20 or $50 US bill and he or one of his local staff members would hurl a wad of Congolese francs and dollars back at the customer.   In addition to selling low-cost Chinese imports, shop owners like Mister Chen have also established themselves as among the most reliable money changers in the city.  ”I trust the Chinese more than I do Congolese,” one customer explained when I asked why he changed his money with Mister Chen and not at one of the countless money changers on the street.  ”They give us a fair price and don’t cheat us.”  By selling low-cost products along with doing a brisk currency trading business, Mister Chen said he is able to squeeze out a small profit.  ”It’s not a lot because the Congolese are very poor but I earn more here than what I was making back in Fuzhou,” he said.

When you consider the hundreds of billions of dollars Western governments and NGOs have spent in Africa to help build civil society programs none seem anywhere near as effective as what Mister Chen is doing.  His small business is simultaneously providing jobs, goods and services that are vital in a region desperate for this kind of economic activity.   Mister Chen does not think of his business as anything other than a means to earn a meager living.  What he may not realize is that what he and his family are doing is part of a larger, more powerful trend that will re-shape Africa in a far more profound way than any of the roads and hospitals Beijing is building here.