This article was originally published on France24.com

The Chinese government stepped up its criticism on Thursday of US and European air strikes on Libya. ”We believe that the objective of enforcing the U.N. Security Council resolution is to protect humanitarian (objectives) and not to create an even bigger humanitarian disaster,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a regular news briefing in Beijing.

Jiang’s comments are just the latest in a series critical signals to come from Beijing over how the coalition is implementing United Nations resolution 1973 that authorised the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya and the bombing of ground targets.

Although China abstained from the vote, Beijing has been very clear in its position that the coalition air attacks risk killing civilians and should be halted immediately.

Chinese trade with Libya

Libya, like other countries in Africa, is an increasingly important Chinese trading partner. Prior to the current unrest, there was an estimated 35,000 Chinese expatriates in the country who largely worked on multi-billion dollar construction projects.

These infrastructure deals point to an increasingly close Sino-Libyan cooperation with Chinese investment in the country totalling an estimated 10 billion dollars and bilateral trade last year nearing seven billion dollars.

“The Chinese are always looking to take the pulse of African states and Middle Eastern states and if the Arab League had not come out in support of this no-fly zone or in support of sanctions I don’t  think the Chinese would have joined in, not nearly as easily as they did.” – Professor Deborah Brautigam

For some perspective on Chinese policy in Libya, I sat down with China-Africa relations scholar Deborah Brautigam of the American University in Washington, D.C. Professor Brautigam is the author of “The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa“ and blogs on the issue at “China in Africa: The Real Story.”

What was behind China’s decision to support economic sanctions against Libya and not block the passage of United Nations resolution 1973 that authorized military force against the Libyan government?

Well, the way I saw it was there was a domestic concern amongst the Chinese leadership. They were looking at companies that are doing huge number of construction projects across Libya. Those Chinese companies were being attacked and the Chinese were having to send in ships and send in planes to evacuate people. So I think if the people in China had seen their government appearing to [ignore the attacks]  on Chinese companies [it would be seen] as the Chinese government not protecting the Chinese people.

Where is the balance of interests for the Chinese in Libya between their economic investments and their political objectives internationally?

I think it’s a combination of interests but what is always foremost in Chinese concerns with the Security Council is they do not want to set a precedent to have the Security Council be turned against China when they’re dealing with their internal disputes as in Xinjiang, Tibet or Taiwan. They don’t want to set a precedent for Security Council action against them.

So that’s always a delicate dance. Now the commercial interests are there as well and we can see that in cases where there are strong commercial interests. For example, in Sudan there’s been much more of an attempt by the Chinese political machine and diplomats at the UN to water down sanctions that would hurt Chinese economic interests.

In Libya it’s a somewhat different situation. They don’t have oil interests that are very large. They don’t have a lot of oil installations, they’re doing exploration, but there isn’t much that they control there.

Most of the Chinese business activity in Libya has been in construction. I was looking back on some of the statistics on this and in 2008 they signed US$10 billion in construction contracts. So this is a lot of business but it’s not something that they need to protect through trying to hold off on sanctions.

Does China see its interests more aligned with African and Arab states than it does with the West or the UN?

That’s an interesting question. The Chinese are always looking to take the pulse of African states and Middle Eastern states and if the Arab League had not come out in support of this no-fly zone or in support of sanctions I don’t  think the Chinese would have joined in, not nearly as easily as they did.

So the Arab League was in support and the Chinese went along.  Unfortunately, African governments and the African Union have not been forceful on the Zimbabwe issue or the Sudan Darfur issue so the Chinese have been taking their cues from that as well. So they see there are a whole lot of countries in Africa, 53 countries,who  have votes at the United Nations, anyone of them could flip over and recognize Taiwan.

There’s a lot of concern in keeping those diplomatic relations happy but for the Chinese, of course, the United States and Europe are really important stakeholders in the global political economy and they care about we think but they also care a lot more then we do about what these other countries think.

Sure, there’s a vigorous debate over just how many hundreds of billions of dollars the West has sent to Africa in the form of “aid” over the past half-century since colonial independence.  Some estimates put it in the trillions, while the OECD and others claim it’s merely in the 800 billion dollar range.  Regardless, the sums are huge.

That said, the amount of money is not what’s in question, the more pressing issue is what has all this “aid” actually accomplished?

The “aid” business

Each year NGOs, state actors and multi-lateral organizations like the UN pour ever greater sums of money into African states and rarely, if ever, are they actually held to account for the effectiveness of these costly programs.  Despite ever growing aid and development budgets, many of the key poverty indicators across Africa remain stubbornly high.

Aid industry critic and NYU professor William Easterly argues that the aid business itself is partially to blame for the problems.  The high level of professional incompetence on the part of too many young and inexperienced aid “experts” mixed with the economic distortions that result from the billions of aid dollars that flow through these countries often combine to form a toxic mix with debilitating consequences.

Enter the Chinese

Ten years after the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit that marked Beijing’s renewed enthusiasm for African engagement, the surge of Chinese investment, migration and influence across the continent is unmistakable. Like the West, the Chinese are pouring billions of dollars into Africa.  However, that money is largely going to support an aggressive agenda to acquire natural resources with complex cash and infrastructure deals.

Beijing’s so-called “No Strings Attached” trade-based approach has sparked the ire of Western governments and the aid industry who largely dismiss the Chinese as neo-mercantalists, even neo-colonials. That indignation, though, is prompting a growing number of analysts to raise their eyebrows.  Fellow African Boots.com blogger and Beijing-based policy analyst Bradley Gardner highlighted in a recent article, “Aid, Trade & Some Indignation,” the inherent contradiction of EU/US states generously subsidizing their agricultural sectors that ultimately deprive developing world farmers of selling their goods at fair market value; subsequently impoverishing these states only to make them more dependent on Western aid.

The recent shooting of Zambian mine workers by Chinese supervisors and the well-documented corruption that accompanies many of China’s massive natural resource deals are indicative that Beijing’s African foreign policy is troubled in equally challenging ways.  However, the Chinese rejection of the Western aid model and the emphasis on trade deserves our attention.  After all, in a shorter period of time, China pulled more people out of subsistence poverty than any other society in human history — with only minimal international assistance.

From a reader and podcast listener in the United States:

“My overarching thought is that I would like to start seeing a bit more focus on the actual impacts of China in Africa (CiA), rather than Western perceptions of China in Africa. Reading your coverage of CiA, I get the impression that you are most interested in exposing western hypocrisy and misconceptions about CiA, rather than the actual effects of CiA. To me, this risks falling into what I see as a fairly well established narrative in much of academia and certain media outlets where it is considered correct to bash the former colonial powers while giving present-day African governments (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/04/AR2008010404300.html for an example), and potentially neo-colonial powers such as China, little attention.

ERIC OLANDER: You are absolutely right that among the central motivations of the China in Africa (CiA) content was to highlight the hypocrisies of the West regarding the Chinese presence in Africa.  However, I cannot agree with you more that if that is done to an extreme, it will absolutely fall in to the stereotypical trap that has ensnared so many other observers of this issue.   The hypocrisies of the West is but one part of this multifaceted story.  Subsequent to receiving your feedback, we have modified the podcast to be far more issue and country specific rather than rely on broader, over-arching issues that are much easier to generalize.

In other words, a focus on Western hypocrisy/misdeeds in Africa is nothing new, and, in my mind, is sometimes so overplayed that people/governments/institutions who should receive more scrutiny do not by virtue of the fact that they are not one of the former colonial powers.

ERIC OLANDER: On the one hand, I think you are correct in saying that blaming the old colonial powers for incompetence and greed is an old story.  However, I will take issue with you on the point of attacking the aid industry.  With few exceptions there is very little critical review of the international aid industry.  Sites like Aid Watch are among only a handful of organizations that provide any kind oversight to this multi-billion dollar industry.  The fact that the Chinese are now operating in the same environments, often to much greater effect, than the traditional aid providers is worthy of examination.

Secondly, you mentioned in your podcast with Charlie Pistorius (which was very interesting and professionally done) that you are not, or do not wish to be perceived as a China apologist, but then the substance of the podcast belied the statement. For instance, I noted that:

• You mentioned the possible negative effects of China in Africa – environmental impacts, corruption – but then didn’t really address these.
• Instead, you spent much of the podcast focusing on European and American hypocrisy regarding China. Even though you mentioned that there is hypocrisy on all sides of this issue, neither of you provided any examples of Chinese or African hypocrisy.

ERIC OLANDER: All fair points indeed.  As a reporter who has aggressively covered China for over 20 years, I do not characterize myself as an apologist.  However, in that particular interview, I do see your point that I did not properly articulate the shortcomings of Chinese or African policies.

Lastly, I found the statement you made about Westerners wanting ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ to be particularly galling. This is a gross stereotype that doesn’t add any value to the conversation. I have actually heard this sentiment expressed fairly often—by many educated Westerners and Africans (I like to avoid the increasingly hackneyed term “elites”)—and believe that it falls into the category of thinking that can be roughly described as: “it’s okay to making sweeping, generalizations about these people and what they think because their ancestors and governing structures were historical oppressors.” One, this statement can be easily falsified—I present many of my acquaintances and myself as evidence. Two, would you consider saying something like: “The Chinese like their Africans pliant, corruptible, and ruled by strong men, so they can keep siphoning off their resources and make heaps of cash from them, whilst dumping surplus people who might otherwise cause problems for the communist party”? I believe your grasp of these issues is very nuanced, so I found this statement somewhat surprising.

ERIC OLANDER: The statement that Westerners prefer ‘their Africans to be poor, needy, etc.’ is rooted in the deeply held, popular perceptions of Africans as nothing more than victims in the eyes of the West.  There are very powerful, long-established “embedded narratives” that shape the news coverage and popular media surrounding Africa and Africans.   These narratives subsequently frame the image of the place and its people as nothing more than mere caricatures.  From Bob Geldof to Bono to news coverage of the current story-du-jour in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the perception of Africans generally falls in to one of four buckets: 1) Poor (Time magazine cover of Ethiopian baby); 2) Fighting (kids fighting Liberia, Somalia, et al); 3) Safari (the predominant image of the continent) and 4) singing (from Paul Simon to Shakira).   It is very difficult to challenge these simplistic notions of complex cultures and societies.  I have worked in over a dozen newsrooms around the world and the level of sophistication about Africa among journalists, editors and producers is embarrassing.  Moreover, journalists on the ground in Johannesburg, Kinshasa and elsewhere complain bitterly that they every time they pitch a story that falls outside of the embedded narrative, their editors in New York/London/Paris either show no interest or reject the idea.

Clearly, people such as you, me and others who have a more textured experience with the region and its people are more sophisticated when it comes to separating the reality from the stereotypes.  However, I contend that the culture at large (in much of the rest of the world) still regards Africa and Africans within the confines of their limited worldview — and like it that way.  Challening stereotypes is a very difficult undertaking and thus, as I said, Westerners prefer their image of Africans to be poor, needy and dependent rather than the reality that you and I both know is so very different.

From a reader and podcast listener in Scandinavia:

“I’d be wary of saying that the topic you’re talking about is commonly misunderstood or not understood.   There are many people out there doing good work on China issues and the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” might become a turn-off eventually.”

ERIC OLANDER: I agree that dismissing an idea with the sweeping statement “they just don’t get it” could potentially alienate more sophisticated listeners and readers.  I will definitely pay more attention to being very specific in the future.  However, it is worth noting (as mentioned above) that in many cases, I am trying to attack particular stereotypes that are widely held in certain societies on a particular issue.  In the United States, for example, where  knowledge about China among the general public is minimal at best, there are a number of times where it is appropriate to challenge the prevailing societal view with “they just don’t get it.”  That said, it should be done sparingly and with precision.

“One of the reasons why I loved your media podcast was because it was so on point while at the same time discussing the new and important media trends in China. The podcast on the Middle East was also really interesting, but it veered a bit off point at times. There’s so much fascinating Sino-Middle East stuff to talk about without having to turn the conversation into a talk about Islamic terrorism, if you know what I mean.”

ERIC OLANDER: I am glad to hear that you found the podcast on China’s new challenges in the Middle East to be useful. Unfortunately, it appears that one of the central messages I was trying to convey was lost somewhere in the discussion.   I do believe that Islamic terrorism is a relevant topic when discussing China’s increasingly complex interests in the region.  China now has active oil interests in several countries that have well-established Islamic terror networks including Iran, Sudan and Algeria among others.  On several occasions, al Qaeda has pronounced China to be an “enemy of Islam” and threaten to attack Beijing’s interests around the world.   Al Qaeda is responding to China’s growing presence in Islamic countries as well as on behalf of Islamic separatists in Western China.  The issue of terrorism, in my opinion, is therefore germane to the broader discussion of China’s Mideast foreign policy.  I regret that this was not successfully communicated.

In this edition of the China in Africa podcast, host Eric Olander talks with Washington, D.C.-based writer and journalist Te-Ping Chen.   Chen is an editor for change.org where she writes extensively on sustainability and social entrepreneurship in the developing world.    In a recent post on What the West Can Learn From China in Africa, Chen addressed the sensitive issue about China’s investment and development initiatives in Africa that diverge from traditional Western aid strategies.  Many Westerners reject the Chinese approach over concerns that Beijing’s longheld disdain for transparency breeds corruption.  However, Chen contends that the issue is far more textured than just the transparency argument presented by critics.  The Chinese, she says, employ an entirely different mindset in their approach to African economic development, one that is often misunderstood by Western journalists and observers.  The fact that Chinese investment is not tied to civil and political reform as is often required by Western aid agencies is not because they’re fundamentally corrupt, Chen argues, but rather evidence of Beijing’s agnosticism on non-economic issues.  This non-ideological, agnostic approach to development that emphasizes practical, tangible results over process ”falls outside of the traditional aid umbrella,” according to Chen, and will most likely force the West to re-evaluate its own policies that have produced mixed results at considerable expense.

Unfortunately, the phone connection with Washington, D.C. was not clear throughout the entire program, so a transcript of the podcast is available below.

CHINA TALKING POINTS: I want to start by asking you about a blog post you wrote on April 19th of last month about what the West can learn from China’s activities in Africa and in your first paragraph you talk about the suspicions that are prevalent in the West about China in general and their African policies in particular. Where do you think those suspicions come from?

CHEN: The skepticism that we see comes across in so many different ways.   It starts with language.  All this talk of China being this hungry hungry dragon on this great African adventure [is part of the] loaded language that gets used frequently in China’s involvement in Africa which feeds in to the already resident skepticism that folks already have about China.   For much of the skepticism that we see a lot of it comes down to ignorance.  There is not a lot of knowledge about China’s involvement in Africa which is a function of a number of factors:

1. A dearth of information.
2. There is a language gap, obviously
3. China has not equipped itself with a team of savvy PR experts to effectively tell its side of the story

I think a lot of this stuff comes down to the fact that there is this vacuum of information that gets filled with a lot of irresponsible media coverage.  Obviously it’s an attractive story line.  There’s this sense of almost gleeful reporting like “look who’s exploiting Africa now, you know, we’re not the only colonizers.”  That’s the kind of theme you see in quite a bit of the press, particularly in the British press.

CHINA TALKING POINTS: Is the skepticism that you describe about the Chinese in Africa separate from the larger skepticism that the media has about China as a whole or is part and parcel of the general China meme that’s out there in the media?

CHEN: I think it’s part and parcel of the general China meme with the added benefit that obviously the narrative about a new continent and Africa resonates deeply with Western audiences which is why I think you see a lot of overblown rhetoric coming out of articles that will often cite quote-unquote “critics” of China’s involvement in Africa.    Usually those will come back to the same two critics.  They’ll quote [former South African President] Thabo Mbeki and [Zambian opposition leader] Michael Sata but they won’t cite, for example, the public opinion reports which actually do find that in a number of African countries surveyed if you ask them to compare U.S. involvement in their country and Chinese involvement  that actually margins of between 60-90 percent of the people say Chinese involvement is beneficial.  And the fact that you do see that kind of one-sided presentation is quite telling.

“If you read China’s official position on development policy there’s more a sense of agnosticism and a recognition that there can be no one overarching model that can be deployed across the entire continent of Africa” – Te-Ping Chen

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  One of the other implicit themes that’s in that coverage is that the way the Chinese are going about it is somehow sinister or somehow manipulative even, dare I say it, “colonial.”  Whereas the Western aid model is considered effective and somehow seen as “without us the deluge.” When you were writing the blog post on what the west can learn from China, what were some of the ideas that you think the folks down the street from you in Washington at USAID (The United States Agency for International Development) and other agencies can learn from what the Chinese are doing in Africa?

CHEN: I think that something that is interesting to raise is the question of what we define as the Chinese model?  Typically the way we hear it being presented is in opposition to the supposed “Washington Consensus” which is much more ideologically driven, much more about democratization.  Whereas the Chinese model is presented as the Chinese willingness to do business with absolutely anybody and the political “amoralization” of their work in Africa.  I think that is obviously an aspect of China’s policy of non-interference but I think, also, there are more relevant ways you can talk about China’s work in Africa and ways that foster a way more productive discussion of aid in Africa.  For example, instead of presenting China as this exporter of dictatorship,  why not talk about the many ways that China’s aid in Africa is actually more efficient? The preference for pragmatism over paperwork? When we have a situation like what Owen Barder has written on his blog about Senegal’s 82 individual aid coordination forums that Chinese preference for pragmatism over paperwork can be quite refreshing.  And I also think as well, the Chinese model that values agnosticism that is, in many ways, better suited to the realities of development in Africa.  You know, we’re talking about a continent of over 50 countries and I think there’s a lot that Western donors and developers can learn [from the Chinese].

CHINA TALKING POINTS: OK, so, you say when you have conversations that attempt to contrast the myths with the reality that it often falls on deaf ears. What are some of the conversations that you have, even with your colleagues at change.org or in Washington about the Chinese in Africa?  Is there an appreciation for what the Chinese are doing or is it “they’re not democratic, they’re Communist nothing that they do is valid?”

CHEN: It depends, of course, on who you talk to.   I think there is an appreciation among certain circles of aid critics for the agnosticism that the Chinese model can promote over traditional western models.  I do think though in many activist circles there is a lack of knowledge and, accordingly, skepticism.  Though, then again, if you take someone like, say, Bob Geldof as any kind of bellwether, lately you’re hearing more accommodating statements like “the U.S. is pulling out and China at least is still committed to Africa.” And, as well, Duncan Green of Oxfam has pointed out the greater involvement of China in Africa  does give African nations more of a bargaining opportunity in its relationship with the West.

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  Yeah, it strikes me as rather surprising given the scale of China’s participation and engagement with Africa — now the second largest trading partner with Africa, soon to be the first — their investments are more diversified than the Americans which are largely in the oil sector – that there isn’t broader awareness of what’s happening and geopolitically how critically important it is as the United States needs to diversify its oil supplies away from the Middle East to more stable places.  Why do you think there is such a blind spot when it comes to this very important trend that is taking place?

CHEN: Again, a lot of it is the fact that there isn’t a lot of information out there and what is being supplied is being supplied through pieces of the narrative that don’t present the full picture.  I think the media has sort of seized upon this narrative of ”China in Africa” and “China’s African Safari” and it’s very much focused on one level.    You’ll hear about how Chinese goods areshoddy but you don’t hear about the benefits for consumers.  You’ll hear again about all these critics but you won’t hear about all the public opinion polls saying that Africans appreciate China’s presence.  So I do think that you see that vacuum of information being filled by the same tired kinds of articles and my hope is that we are going to be able to get beyond Howard French’s piece of “meet Africa’s latest colonizer.”

CHINA TALKING POINTS: Yeah, using the terminology “colonizer” and “colony” sets the wrong tone because it’s really not that, and that’s what is so dangerous is that people are thinking it’s like a British or European colonial adventure when in fact it’s something very different.   I want to go back to a point that you brought up earlier about this idea of competing ideologies.  I have a theory and I’d like to hear your reaction to it:  that there is a war of ideas and many Americans think that now the cold war is over and the Soviets had one way of looking at the world and the Americans had another.  We won game finished.  Now I wonder if there is this new ideological war that is going on that is divided into three categories — the so-called “Washington Consensus” led by the United States and Western Europe that emphasizes civil and political rights alongside economic development.  The second one is religious extremism as best exemplified by Al Qaeda in places like North Africa, the Caucuses and the Middle East.  Finally, there is the “Beijing Consensus” that is very appealing as it offers countries the chance to modernize without Westernizing.  What’s your reaction to this kind of theory and if it’s plausible that it’s being played out in places like Africa?

CHEN: That’s a tough one.  I think you’re certainly picking up on one element of what’s happening and there’s no doubt that Beijing does present a different model, if you want to call it that, to the “Washington Consensus.”   But I also think that a number of Chinese officials would be a little bit hesitant to embrace that their “model” is in fact a quote-unquote “model.”  If you read China’s official position on development policy there’s more a sense of agnosticism and a recognition that there can be no one overarching model that can be deployed across the entire continent of Africa, much less in Asia.   So if there is any alternative being promoted, I’d like to think that there is this sense that just as China found its own path out of poverty without the influence of multilaterals and aid agencies, likewise I think it can serve not exactly as a compass, but certainly a demonstration of the fact that it’s possible to build your own independent path towards development however that’s defined in your country.

“You’ll hear again about all these critics but you won’t hear about all the public opinion polls saying that Africans appreciate China’s presence” - Te-Ping Chen

CHINA TALKING POINTS: You mentioned earlier about some of the shortcomings the Chinese have in termsof their ability to communicate their story and the ability to articulate what they are doing and thus allows a vacuum for critics to fill with sometimes nonsense and misinformation.   With that in mind, what are some of the risks the Chinese face as their engagement with Africa increases?  What are some of the “potholes” they need to be aware of?

CHEN: It depends on where you are looking, but certainly in Africa some of the bigger points of conflict have been over labor relations and we have seen from some of the bigger Chinese firms that the longer they stay in Africa the more locals they need to hire.  Again, this notion that China through its special economic zones [in Africa] will be able to create “Chinese enclaves” has been damaging and will continue to be damaging.  I think to an extent that’s offset by something that you’ve documented in your own work Eric, unlike Western workers in Africa, the million plus Chinese immigrants that have come to Africa tend to live side by side with Africans, tend to speak local dialects, purchase food at the local markets and aren’t driving around in massive SUVs. The question of transparency too has continued to dog China, particularly in Africa.  I think for Western observers we have to be a little bit careful there when we talk about it though.  To me, what matters is results on the ground and to an extent we have seen this issue of transparency has just served as a conversation stopper. Beyond that I think it’s important for China to be able to communicate that it really is around for the long haul and that’s another big misconception about China’s development in Africa that it’s the “Great Chinese Takeout” and that the Chinese are there to grab their oil, grab some trees and get out — and that’s not the case, it’s a more textured exchange one in which many more Chinese are immigrating [to Africa].  China’s shift to Africa is part of the country’s shift away from its focus on production of cheap consumer goods like t-shirts and the like towards more emphasis on higher value goods.

CHINA TALKING POINTS:  So, finally, what do you think is the most important aspect of what the Chinese are doing in Africa that people should understand?

CHEN: A lot of coverage in the West misses the fact that the China’s engagement in Africa has extended over decades, likewise they are mis-portraying this notion of the great Chinese take out when, in fact, you look at immigration, when you look at China’s positioning in Africa is really part of the country’s broader  hope to transition away from its emphasis on just the production of cheap consumer goods, t-shirts and the like, they’re really hoping to use Africa as an opportunity to move up the value chain and develop factories in Africa as part of that process.  So I think that one of the chief misconceptions is this great resource grab, this “Great Chinese Takeout” when in fact the Chinese are not intending to leave.

______________

About Te-Ping Chen

Te-Ping Chen is an editor at Change.org.  Most recently she was a staff reporter for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.  In recent years, her writing has appeared in outlets that include the Nation Magazine, the American Prospect, the South China Morning Post magazine, Le Soir and Slate.com.  She is a U.S. Truman Scholar whose work has shared awards from the Overseas Press Club and Investigative Reporters and Editors.

In the end, French reaches the same, stereotypical conclusion that most Western writers come to with their China in Africastories, that Beijing is merely following the same path of colonial exploitation as Europeans and Americans did duringtheir imperial adventures.  In fact, French’s last paragraph of the article concludes that the relationship between Africa and China will mirror Africa’s previous ties to other empires through the extraction of raw materials and the re-importation to Africa of finished products.  This is where French is either mis-informed or doesn’t fully understand the scope of China’s engagement in the region.

So while you read the article yourself, I propose the following additional points to consider:

• The Chinese engagement with Africa cannot simply be defined on an economic level, the arrival of hundreds of thousands (soon to be millions) of poor Chinese immigrants who are moving in to neighborhoods across the continent will have a profound impact.  In less than five years, there are now more Chinese immigrants in Africa than France had at the height of its colonial power on the continent.  These immigrants are not just the workers who labor on the infrastructure and mining projects, but also economic migrants who are establishing small businesses and contributing to an emerging civil society in ways that billions of dollars of wasted Western economic development assistance could never achieve.

• At one point in the article, French mentions “when the Chinese leave” which is another key difference between the Chinese presence in Africa and former Western colonial powers.  Simply put, the Chinese are NOT leaving.  This is not like the French, Germans or British who left when it was no longer economically viable to sustain their expensive colonies.  Just as there are now a million ethnic Chinese living in Southern California who have no intention of returning to Asia, the Chinese emigres are building a permanent presence in Africa.

• French, like the overwhelming majority of his journalistic colleagues, concludes skeptically that China will ultimately fail to build any sustainable economic engagement with Africa.  In the end, they contend, it comes down to merely pulling out as much oil, gold, bauxite and other natural resources from the earth.  The reason I challenge French on this point is that he goes to the same guy that every other journalist contacts to get “the other side of the story.”  Zambian opposition leader Michael Sata is the most outspoken critic of the Chinese in Africa, particularly in his own country.  The fact that almost every article on the subject features a quote from Sata is either evidence of journalistic laziness (a real possibility) or the fact that it may be difficult to find articulate critics of the Chinese.  It’s disappointing that French and other writers do not venture off the main roads, past the big construction sites and away from the academic and political elites to get the layman’s perspective on the Chinese in their countries.  When I did this during my time in Kinshasa, I found far more nuanced and textured answers than what was provided to me by so-called “experts.”  French fails to deliver that important perspective strongly enough.

• French offers a cynical view on the value of low-cost Chinese imports to Africa.  Just as Wal-Mart did in the United States where it recognized there was a viable market among the working poor that most other companies ignored, China is opening new markets for its products at the lowest rung of the economic ladder in developing countries across South Asia, South America and Africa.  Liberal elites in the coastal U.S. cities turn their noses up at Wal Mart with the same dismissive attitude they display for China’s arrival in the Southern Hemisphere.  The fact remains in places like the DRC where people have extremely limited disposal income, the ability to purchase headphones, toys, food products and electronics is nothing short of revolutionary.  These are all products we take for granted in developed societies and things that critics hope developing societies will avoid so as to prevent the corruption their “traditional” cultures.  The overwhelming cultural arrogance of that perspective is a separate issue, while the Chinese offering this critical service deserve praise.  The Chinese are operating in markets with such limited margins where Western and Japanese companies simply cannot compete with their significantly higher cost structures.  Contrary to popular journalistic perception, the Chinese behavior in these markets is nothing like their colonial predecessors and deserve separate analysis.

Listen to the full interview here.

Here is a summary and critique of the issues addressed in the interview:

CHINA’S “MOTIVE” IN AFRICA?

Evans opens the interview by asking Liu about “China’s motive” in Africa.  There’s nothing actually wrong with the question, there’s just an arrogance to it through the use of the word “motive.”  It’s comparable to how the BBC, CNN and other international news organizations selectively use the word “regime” to define a government.  Somehow,  Beijing is a “regime” and Washington is a “government.”  The word “regime,” as does “motive,” has a distinctly negative connotation that is rarely applied to Western governments.  I have never heard a comparable question of what “America’s motive” is anywhere in the world.   It should go without saying that China’s “motive” in Africa is multifaceted driven by a blend of economic, political, humanitarian and military interests — no different than Washington, London or Paris’ “motives” in the region.

Importantly, Liu does highlight a key difference between the Chinese perspective on Africa and that in the West.  For most government and populations in the U.S. and Europe, Africa is regarded as a basket case of war, disease, famine and decades of failed development policies.  In contrast, Liu highlights, the Chinese see Africa as opportunity.  Beyond the obvious extractive industries, the Chinese are engaging the continent as an export market that the West long ago abandoned.   Furthermore, China’s development policies in Africa are proving to be far more effective than those of bloated, expensive and ineffective Western aid agencies.  Liu rightly points that China’s effectiveness is leading to enhanced political ties in the region at the expense of the former colonial and international powers.

SANCTIONS

Following the international community’s successful sanctions campaign against South Africa’s former apartheid government in the late 80s and early 90s, a pipe dream still exists within the UN, US and the EU that sanctions are an effective tool at isolating despotic governments.   Yet after two decades of evidence to the contrary where Myanmar, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Zimbabwe and many others have defied international sanctions policies, the presumption that sanctions actually work persists.   It was refreshing then to hear Ambassador Liu challenge this conventional wisdom by clearly stating that China does not support sanctions measures because mass populations suffer disproportionately compared to the elites.  Liu was responding to Evans’ question about China’s unwillingness to join the West to coordinate a sanctions policy against Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe.   China, as mentioned earlier in this post, should be scrutinized for its military sales to Zimbabwe but not on the issue of supporting yet another failed sanctions policy.

THE DALAI LAMA QUESTION

One has to wonder what the Western media would do without the Dalai Lama.  He is such a convenient package for journalists who are either too lazy or too uninformed to know better that a question about the DL offers very little insight on Chinese policy.  Ambassador Liu stuck to the party line with his response that the DL is a separatist political figure who seeks to divide China.    Now, I understand what Evans was trying to achieve with the question by implying that if an African country invited the Dalai Lama to visit it would no doubt complicate relations with Beijing.  The reason why it is such an objectionable question in the context of Chinese foreign policy in Africa there are so many  more pressing and relevant issues that need to be addressed with someone at Ambassador Liu’s level.

WHAT STEVE EVANS SHOULD HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR LIU:

1) Describe China’s military presence in Africa specifically the PLA base in the DRC’s Katanga province.  Is the purpose of the base to be part of a multilateral peacekeeping operation or its own deployment to protect Chinese interests in the eastern DRC?  Should we expect to see a larger presence of Chinese military and armed private contractors on the continent?

2) The industrial deforestation tools the Chinese are using for logging in Mozambique, Congo and Zimbabwe among other areas is raising serious concerns that the Chinese are hollowing out Africa’s forests at rate that is unsustainable.  Is China monitoring this trend and what specific protections, if any, are in place to prevent this from occuring?

3) With hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants coming to Africa each year, what is the feedback he is receiving from host governments on the presence of this large, new population?  In places like Namibia and Zambia, there is growing discontent by political leaders over the presence of an increasingly large Chinese population.  How is he responding to these challenges?

FINALLY…

The Western media’s blatant double standard for how it treats different governments is the most annoying aspect of this whole affair.  Compare, for example, this CNN feature that goes behind the scenes on how their reporter & camerawoman interact with the U.S. military in Afghanistan.  The CNN crew is embedded with Alpha Company and as such eats, sleeps and seemingly enjoys each other’s company.  ITN and the BBC did comparable puff stories embedded with British troops in both the Iraqi and Afghan theater of operations.  This chuminess with the militaries extends to their political leaders as well when journalists like Steve Evans rarely use that same cynical approach in interviews as they so often do with Chinese leaders.

It’s really too bad as we would all benefit from less fluff coverage of Western governments and more balanced coverage of China.

There is a massive knowledge gap among the vast majority of Americans and Europeans both here and in the West about the scale of  China’s foreign policy in Africa.    What so many Westerners appear to be ignore is how China is re-shaping international relations in this part of the world and that is leading to diminished influence for Washington and Brussels, potential severe climate change consequences and the likelihood that Beijing will have exclusive control of certain strategic raw materials.

The Chinese are engaged here.  They are on the ground in ways that Americans and Europeans could never conceive.  Moreover, the scope of that engagement is truly breathtaking and now researchers are beginning to get a grasp of the magnitude of their involvement in Africa.

The USC U.S.-China Center has produced an interactive high-level overview of where Chinese investment in Africa is flowing.   Mouse over the different countries to get a brief summary of China’s investment there.  It’s also interesting that they have highlighted the growing number of Chinese language and cultural centers known as “Confucian Institutes.”  This map is an excellent first step to better understanding the scope of Chinese investment across the continent.   What is astonishing is that the vast majority of the investment detailed on this map has happened within the past 5-7 years!  When you see firsthand the amount of equipment, people and supplies the Chinese have imported here, it gives you pause.  Simply put, the Chinese are bringing the same fanatical zeal for development that transformed their own society to the African infrastructure projects that are now reshaping dozens, if not hundreds of cities like Kinshasa.

While this is by no means a zero-sum game or Cold War-style face-off between China and the West, if the West continues to essentially ignore China’s aggressive, new global outlook, its already diminishing international standing will no doubt continue to deteriorate.

• Chinese contractors in the Sicomines mining consortium are reported to have paid a $350 million dollar entry fee that includes some $50 million in signing bonuses given out to varies Congolese entities.
• $23 million of that $50 million is now reported to be “missing” or “unaccounted for,” according to Africa-Asia Confidential.
• The $350 million dollars was a small part of a $6 billion ore-for-infrastructure contract between Chinese state-owned companies and the Congolese mining giant Gecamines (other Congolese companies are also reported to be included in this deal).

Read the full report “Kinshasa’s Missing Millions” from Africa-Asia Confidential here…

The lack of accountability and transparency in China’s natural resource deals in both the DR Congo and across Africa are now starting to show signs that it may ultimately weaken China’s position on the continent.   Here in Kinshasa, President Joseph Kabila is making some of his first public remarks on his growing impatience with the Chinese.  It’s worth noting that Kabila’s comments are worth taking with a huge chunk of salt as he is likely posturing to pressure the Chinese to finish their infrastructure projects so he can claim credit ahead of next year’s presidential elections.  Furthermore, there is widespread speculation that Kabila himself may be among the beneficiaries of some of those “missing Kinshasa millions.”  Nonetheless, that he feels sufficiently embolden to begin using public pressure against the Chinese is noteworthy.

Kabila may in fact be following the lead of Zambian opposition leader Michael Sata who came within a hair’s breadth of winning the October 2008 presidential elections.  Sata ran his campaign on a platform opposing Chinese investment in Zambia, calling the nature of the deals unfair and “colonial.”  Sata, and potentially now Kabila, may be the first indications of growing unease over the speed, scope and scale of Chinese investments in the region.  Their main criticism: labor.  Unlike the waves of foreign investment by former colonial powers, the Chinese have added a distinctive twist to their investments.  Rather than rely on local labor to implement the huge number of infrastructure projects across the country, tens of thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasant laborers have been imported to build the ports, roads, mines and telecommunications infrastructure projects Beijing promised in return for access to the host country’s natural resources.  Before anyone else in Africa complained, Sata was a vocal critic of these deals.  If elected, he promised to re-negotiate the labor contracts to make them more equitable for Zambia by reducing the presence of Chinese workers.  Sata’s threats were heard in Beijing with the government there threatening to end its investment program in Zambia if the opposition leader was elected.  Sata lost by a very small margin.

The DR Congo and Zambia are not alone in their gnawing frustration over the use of imported Chinese labor.  In Southeast Asia, the New York Times reports growing resentment in Vietnam and other nations over the presence of Chinese workers at the expense of local labor.  So the key question now is how will Beijing react to what appears to be a small, yet discernible trend opposing their overseas labor policy:

1. Will they ignore the criticism and continue to employ the aggressive natural resource-for-infrastructure deals?
2. The Chinese are extremely sensitive to public opinion at home and have become quite adept at responding to shifting political winds.  Will they apply that same dexterity with their natural resource-driven foreign policy?
3. Will they offer a few minor face-saving public gestures to satisfy their overseas critics that provide sufficient political cover to continue their operations minus a small percentage of imported Chinese labor?

It would be unwise to bet against the Chinese.  I have done it numerous times in the past and I have regretted it later.  That said, the Chinese are in a totally new space here and they are operating without precedent in international relations.  No country has expanded its natural resource extraction footprint as quickly, aggressively and with as much man power as the Chinese have.  So Beijing must learn as it goes.  For the rest of us, this will be among the most important foreign policy lessons of our generation.

The facts on the ground show China’s engagement in Africa has been more positive than this discourse claims. The Chinese are getting bad press in the West because they are from a country that is neither liberal democratic nor white, yet are effectively competing with those who are – to the point that some Africans see Chinese development activities as providing a model.

Read the full article at ON LINE Opinion

Read full article at the Jakarta Globe