A Bit of Background

First, it was CCTV9.  The ugly, English speaking cousin of CCTV that got a nice facelift a few years ago courtesy of Rupert Murdoch.  News Corp. advisors convinced CCTV9′s management to invest in new sets, a snazzy graphics package and replace the dour looking Chinese anchors with attractive Australians, Africans and other non-Chinese.   CCTV then leveraged its considerable political muscle to expand the network’s global distribution.  In the United States alone, CCTV9′s expanded distribution footprint is nothing short of amazing.   The channel is available on pretty much every major cable and satellite platform from DirecTV to Time Warner Cable.  You can also get your fill of watching Da Shan over the air as CCTV9 is making inroads in regional markets through digital terrestrial television stations as well.  Simply put, CCTV9′s distribution is phenomenal.  Nonetheless, CCTV9 is a tragic case study in how distribution alone is not enough.  I have yet to meet an American television viewer not affiliated with China who has ever heard of CCTV9, much less watched it, even though the channel is right there on their on screen TV guide.

Last year, the Chinese doubled-down on their English language TV investments with the launch of Blue Oceans Network, or BON Live.  Sensitive to the reaction of many international viewers that CCTV9 was simply an extension of the parent channel’s heavily censored content, the new BON brands itself as an “independent network” that produces “objective English language content for the Western world.”   While much of the content has that same “cable access” semi-professional feel to it that is so common on CCTV9, the difference with BON is that it is positioning itself as a Western channel designed exclusively for Western audiences.  That means there are few, if any, Chinese hosts and there is a pretense of independence from the government’s various media censors.

And now… CNC

That China feels the need to launch yet another network is indicative that its prior attempts have not fulfilled the government’s media objectives.  Beijing clearly perceives an injustice is being done by the international media in how it is perceived globally and the best solution is to follow the lead of the French (France24), the Russians (Russia Today) and Qatar (Al Jazeera) by deploying its own television platform to tell its story.   There is little, if any, evidence that suggests CNC will be any more successful than CCTV9 and BON Live in persuading the outside world of China’s positions on critical issues where it comes under such intense scrutiny by the international community.  On the key issues of human rights, Tibet, Taiwan and certain aspects of China’s relationship with the United States, China’s official government media simply lacks the necessary editorial credibility to be taken seriously as an impartial source of news.

Why Al Jazeera is Different

Beijing’s media leaders no doubt look to Al Jazeera as an example of how a state-funded media enterprise can have great effect in swaying public opinion.  Unfortunately for China, Al Jazeera is unique in many ways that do not benefit Beijing.   The key difference between China’s media ventures and Al Jazeera is the level of editorial independence the Qatari government affords the network’s management.  Doha provides Al Jazeera with seemingly endless resources to do pursue stories as it pleases, even if that complicates Qatar’s foreign relations.  Qatar is a staunch ally of the United States, even housing one of the largest American military bases in the Persian Gulf, yet permits Al Jazeera to feature guests and carry and editorial narrative that is constantly critical of American policies in the Gulf and towards the Arab/Muslim world at large.  It is hard to envision China permitting such editorial latitude with CNC’s editors.  Furthermore, Al Jazeera’s editorial management, both in Washington at Al Jazeera English and in Doha with its Arabic language service, is comprised of a journalists from around the world.   When Al Jazeera English launched several years ago, it cherry picked top editorial staff from the world’s leading news organizations with the offer of editorial independence.  While the full potential of that promise has predictably fallen short on some levels, overall that editorial freedom is also difficult to envision in Beijing where no such tradition exists.

What China Should Do…

There is a tremendous opportunity out there for a globally focused China-based television network that is essentially an english-language version of Phoenix TV News.  Instead of relying on its old ways of producing media, here’s what China should do:

• Engage the international media in a meaningful debate on the issues by making its government leaders more accessible to the English language media. It took years for the U.S. government to learn this lesson.  Initially, Washington avoided Al Jazeera, prohibiting its officials to appear on the network.  It then realized that by leaving a vacuum in the airspace, it allowed more time for critics to attack the administration for its Mid East policies.  Now, Arabic speaking American diplomats are regular guests on Al Jazeera.  China should follow suit by making media training in English mandatory for certain high level officials and follow the example of Beijing’s top diplomat on Africa Affairs, Liu Guijin, who appears regularly on international television to articulate China’s position and rebuff the government’s critics.

• Ease restrictions on China-based foreign correspondents to travel and access senior officials. I speak with firsthand experience here in how difficult it is to get officials in Beijing to talk on the record, or better yet on camera.  It takes days, even weeks, to get officials to agree to an interview and when they do it’s often accompanied by a long list of restrictions.  By making their officials more accessible to the foreign press corps and allowing journalists to form meaningful relationships with bureaucrats, they will find that the coverage will soften considerably.  The best example of this is in the United States where an extremely close relationship exists between the government and the media and more often than not, that close relationship often benefits the government significantly more than the media.

• Attract the best international journalists from around the world as Al Jazeera did.  To date, the quality of journalist at China’s english language networks is extremely green.  Largely, CCTV9 and BON Live, along with the China Daily and other similar outlets, are populated by journalists who are either too green to get jobs elsewhere or can’t find jobs elsewhere in the global media.  Instead, the Chinese should recruit from CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera and other established networks who have the experience to take China’s television programs to a much more sophisticated level.  Here’s the hard the part though: these experienced journalists will only come if they have assurances that they can truly tell the story as it is.  CNC’s management will have to include some international personnel and they will have to allow a greater degree of editorial freedom than they are accustomed.

In 2009 I was approached by a Hong Kong-based executive recruiter to join BON Live.  At the time, I was the Vice President of editorial affairs at the largest Chinese TV station in North America and I would have no doubt been a good fit for an endeavor like BON Live.  However, when I inquired about the degree of editorial control I would have over the programs I would manage, it was made very clear to me that I would be required to follow the guidance handed down from management on sensitive issues (those “sensitive issues” were not articulated however I knew exactly what they were: Taiwan/Tibet/June 4/etc…).  If China wants to really be taken seriously in the international TV marketplace, it will eventually have to soften those restrictions to allow for journalists with my level of experience to help them tell their very compelling story.

David Wolff is right to be skeptical that China will ever come around to actually launching a full-scale, internationally credible news network, however they might instead get their act together to assemble a media conglomerate for their entertainment assets.  Here are three reasons why this is a really bad idea:

1) IN THIS DAY AND AGE, BIG IS NOT BETTER: Global media companies like Time Warner, Viacom and Disney are too big to maneuver in the age of the internet.  The future of media is interactive, highly flexible and predominantly online.

2) THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL WITH CARS, BANKS SO WHY NOT MEDIA?: The Chinese appear to be ripping a page from their “conglomerate playbook” where they invest massively in an industry to rapidly build marketshare and then move to compete globally.  The problem, though, is that media is different than manufacturing and financial services because the product’s success depends on the credibility behind the messenger.  Until China can free its news divisions from the grip of the Propaganda Ministry, it will have a hard time convincing the international community that its news and entertainment offers an alternative.

3) THEY ALREADY HAVE SCALE, JUST NOT ON TV: While the State Council may believe that Shanghai Media Group is the future of Chinese media, the truth is that SMG’s audience size will always lie in the shadow of China’s dynamic online media market.  Chinese online media companies like Sina, QQ.com and even Baidu are all ranked in the top 30 of the world’s largest web companies.  It’s totally understandable that China wants to have a stronger voice in the international media space, the problem is that the State Council is going about it the wrong way.  Give 21st century media companies more room to grow and maneuver rather than invest in last century’s media technologies that are rapidily disappearing.

Still not convinced?

The number TV network in the market is not ABC, NBC, CBS or Fox but the Spanish language Univision.  In a market where the majority of the population do not speak English as their first language, it is instructive to watch what happens in the ethnic market as a guide for the overall direction of local media across the US’ top 20 major media markets.

For the past thirty years, the pan-Asian language TV station KSCI TV LA 18 reigned supreme.  With its full-power broadcast license that affords it “must carry” status on every cable and satelitte network in the region along with a powerful over the air broadcast signal, LA 18 was the one to beat.  Over the past decade, though, KSCI’s dominance in the marketplace waned as new, larger players saw opportunity in the million+ Chinese language viewers across the Greater Los Angeles region.  Taiwan’s satellite channels ETTV and CTI were among the first major networks to plant their roots in Southern California, building production and sales operations for their nationally distributed channels.  Not long after, Hong Kong channels like TVB and Phoenix began to make their investment in the region following their competitors from Taiwan.  Unlike other major Chinese populations in the US like San Francisco and New York, Los Angeles was ideally suited for these Hong Kong and Taiwan networks.   A large and growing native-Chinese speaking labor pool made it far easier to staff along with the country’s best broadcast infrastructure were two key criteria that made Southern California an ideal fit.  After establishing themselves on Dish Network and Directv along with building a solid DTH (Direct To Home) satellite platform, the Hong Kong/Taiwan nets turned their attention to building relationships with cable operators in the key Chinese areas.  Now, across the region, on both cable and satellite, between 8-10 various direct-from-Asia Chinese language networks are available to viewers.  The catch, and there’s always a catch, is that both cable and satellite operators did not want to give up valuable bandwidth capacity for a relatively small niche market.  If you are at Time Warner and ESPN or MTV approches you to air a channel that will be relevant to three out of the six million TV homes in the market compared to a Chinese language station that appeals to a vastly smaller slice of the audience, the choice is rather clear.  So in response, the cable/sat networks all placed the Chinese channels on premium tiers that required additional monthly fees.

So long as Chinese language programming remained in the premium tier, KSCI was safe from significant competition.  Chinese consumers are famous for the tight spending and the prospect of adding $40-$70 to the monthly cable bill for extra premium channels was not very appealing for most viewers.  The easy access (again, the station’s unique must-carry status gives the channel unrivaled distribution over its rivals) for viewers to watch the station gave it a huge advantage.  That advantage, though, came under new attack in the early 2000s when access to the public airwaves opened up through introduction of digital television.  For most American consumers, DTV was a non-event that occured on June 12, 2009.  I say it was a non-event since the majority of television viewers in this country receive their signal via cable and satellite services that were unaffected by the switch from analog to digital signals.  In immigrant communities across the country, over the air TV remains the preeminent distribution channel so this switch marked an important milestone.  In the years leading up to the June 12th DTV deadline, a number of stations in the LA market added digital transmission to their analog signals to take advantage of the growing number of consumers who could access these signals with new digital-ready tvs.  LA’s Chinese language TV market then experienced an explosion of choice.   One after another, Chinese programmers rushed into the marketplace with a high quality television programming from the ROC, HK and PRC.  Now instead of just having one over the air channel, there are four.  In all, over a dozen Chinese language broadcasters now fight it out for a slice of the market.

What makes this media battle so unique is that it is one of the only regions in the world where broadcasters from Taiwan, Hong Kong and China all make their content available on an equal footing.  In China, as is widely known, channel line-up and preference is given to state broadcasters.  In Hong Kon and Taiwan, there are formidible restrictions to what networks can air on certain platforms.  In the US, Southern California specifically, no such limitations exist.  While this bounty of choice is a blessing for the consumer, it will be interesting to see how many of these broadcasters can survive in a tight ad market with so much competition.